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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

USING INOCULATION MESSAGES TO
PROTECT “STAY IN THE MARKET” BELIEFS
DURING FINANCIAL CRISES
This paper focuses on the problem of collapsed “stay in the market” (SIM) beliefs
during financial crises. The primary purpose of this investigation was to ascertain
whether or not inoculation messages represent a viable communication strategy to
preemptively protect SIM beliefs during forthcoming financial crises. Ancillary purposes
of this study were to further investigate the role of print and video crises, explicit
instructions regarding post-inoculation talk (PIT), and gain and loss frame inoculation
messages on the inoculation process. This study used a between subjects factorial design
(3 x 2 plus four additional conditions) to explore ten hypotheses. Data collected from
513 participants were analyzed using multivariate and univariate tests and planned
comparisons. The results of this investigation indicate that inoculation messages can
serve as a viable preemptive crisis communication strategy, that inoculation can protect
beliefs equally well when the crisis message is presented through video or print, and that
employing a loss frame can strengthen the inoculation process. Mixed results regarding
PIT call for further research. Research and practical implications, as well as limitations,
are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This paper joins the well-established inoculation theory scholarship (see Compton
& Pfau, 2005) with a contextual focus on investor sell-offs amidst financial crisis.
Specifically, this study addresses the ability of investor “stay in the market” (SIM) beliefs
to withstand market turbulence. SIM beliefs can be defined as the underlying consistent
belief of individual investors that market holdings should not be liquidated as an
unplanned reaction to negative market events or overall market turbulence (Basu, Raj, &
Tchalian, 2008; Hudomiet, Kezdi, & Willis, 2011). This paper posits that messages
based on inoculation theory offer an effective strategy for financial institutions to
proactively manage future financial crises by providing investors with messages designed
to protect existing SIM beliefs against persuasive attack.
Inoculation messages create resistance to persuasion by offering two sides of a
controversial topic in an attempt to reinforce an existing attitude, belief, opinion while
lessening the impact of future persuasive attacks (Compton & Pfau, 2005). Research has
shown that inoculation theory functions by pointing to the vulnerability of a person’s
existing belief (termed as threat), introducing possible oppositional viewpoints to that
belief, and then providing refutational preemption (i.e., statements in support of the
original belief designed to overwhelm the oppositional viewpoint) (Compton & Pfau,
2005; Ivanov, 2011).
While, as this paper argues, inoculation messages can offer an effective solution
to the issue of collapsed SIM beliefs, four potential barriers to inoculation’s applied use
are addressed: a preference for no communication, preference for a bolstering strategy, a
lack of understanding about how inoculation messages will function in absence of crisis,
and a research gap concerning the impact of crisis communication medium.
1

Theoretically grounded hypotheses and experimental test methods are offered as a
research-driven strategy for addressing and overcoming these barriers to applied use.
In addition to the four barriers to inoculation’s applied use mentioned above, this
study attempts to extend inoculation research by testing two theoretical concepts that
could impact the application of inoculation theory to the context of SIM beliefs. First,
this study addresses the impact of post-inoculation talk (PIT) on the process of generating
resistance to persuasion. While inoculation was long considered an entirely sub-vocal
process (see Compton & Pfau, 2005) recent research (Ivanov, Miller, et al., 2012) has
suggested that interpersonal conversations about the issue following the inoculation
message can strengthen the generated resistance to persuasion. The interpersonal
conversations about the inoculation message are termed PIT in inoculation research.
However, further research is needed to nuance the role of PIT in the inoculation process.
Therefore, since PIT may strengthen resistance (Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012), this study
will be the first to examine whether or not PIT can be artificially boosted by suggesting
that participants discuss the issue as part of the inoculation message. If the results of this
study show that PIT can be artificially boosted, financial institutions that employ an
inoculation strategy can also bolster their efforts by encouraging PIT and even providing
investors a venue to connect with their peers.
The second theoretical concept addressed in this study is the role of gain and loss
message framing on the effectiveness of inoculation treatments, particularly with regard
to the context of protecting SIM beliefs amidst financial crisis. Prospect theory’s core
concept, that losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rick, 2010), is
integrated into inoculation messages designed to protect SIM beliefs. The financial
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content inherent in inoculation messages geared towards SIM belief protection offers a
unique opportunity to emphasize either the potential for gain or loss. If prospect theory is
supported and loss-framed inoculation messages generate greater resistance, this finding
will offer practitioners greater insight into the best way to use inoculation messages to
protect SIM beliefs.
In the proceeding sections, literature relating to SIM beliefs and the financial
context, inoculation theory in general, inoculation theory in crisis communication,
barriers to inoculation theory’s application, post-inoculation talk, and gain and loss
message framing is reviewed. Ten hypotheses relating to the areas of reviewed literature
are offered, in addition to the proposed test method. Results for each hypothesis and a
corresponding discussion conclude this investigation.

Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
SIM Beliefs
As previously mentioned, “stay in the market” (SIM) beliefs can be defined as the
underlying consistent belief of individual investors that market holdings should not be
liquidated as an emotional or irrational reaction to negative market events or overall
market turbulence (Basu et al., 2008; Hudomiet et al., 2011). Stated simply, SIM beliefs
are an integral part of two common investing strategies, either a buy and hold or timing
(i.e., buy low/sell high) approach (Hilliard & Hilliard, 2011). Each of these strategies
mandate that investors avoid selling securities during a market downturn (Hilliard &
Hilliard, 2011). SIM beliefs are established prior to financial crisis as an ideal strategy
for sustaining financial crisis in a way that is most beneficial to an investment portfolio’s
success (Hartmann, 2010). Therefore, for SIM beliefs to exist, they must be established
in anticipation of financial crises with the knowledge that those crises can result in a loss
of portfolio value. SIM beliefs’ prerequisite condition of thinking through possible
negative market scenarios in relation to one’s portfolio by default means that SIM belief
holders will often have a long investment time horizon (Zweig, 2008).
SIM beliefs are typically socially constructed between a financial organization
and its clients, who are investors in the financial markets (Hartmann, 2010; Vitt, 2004).
Strong SIM beliefs are mutually beneficial for an investor and financial institution
because a securities sell-off during a market turndown can create severe financial
ramifications for both parties. In addition, federal law requires that financial institutions
inform investors about the possibility of a decline in asset values during market
downturns (i.e., investment risk) prior to purchasing securities (Hartmann). Since selling
securities at the bottom of a market cycle is rarely a recommended investment practice, as
4

previously mentioned, SIM beliefs are an integral part of many investing scenarios (Vitt,
2004; Weller, 2011).
While understanding and protecting SIM beliefs is of vital importance, as this
paper argues, a key distinction must be made. Violation of SIM beliefs occurs when
investors make irrational decisions to sell securities amidst poor market conditions (i.e.,
panic) to the detriment of the investor, financial institution, and possibly the financial
market as a whole. However, some investors must sell securities in less than optimal
market conditions (i.e., financial crises) due to a variety of legitimate reasons. For
example, an investor might have a short time frame until retirement that prohibits further
declines in asset value and thus necessitates selling securities and holding a cash
portfolio. Or, an investor might have major expenses that occur during a financial crisis
that call for a conversion to cash regardless of recent market losses. However, the
improvement of sound decision making processes amidst financial crisis is outside the
scope of this study. This research concerns message strategies designed to prevent
potential investor panic about market conditions that results in an irrational and harmful
securities sell-off (i.e., a violation of SIM beliefs).
If SIM beliefs are not present or are violated (i.e. securities are liquidated for
irrational reasons), an investor can seriously hinder his or her portfolio’s ability to fully
recover from a reduction in asset value resulting from a market downturn (Zweig, 2008).
Violating SIM beliefs by selling securities and holding the portfolio in cash would not
allow an investor to capitalize on subsequent market upswings that would provide an
opportunity to regain diminished asset value (Weller, 2011).
In addition to harming an individual investor’s portfolio, an absence or violation
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of SIM beliefs harms the financial interests of the organization facilitating the
investments. Retail brokerage institutions earn a majority of revenue based on a
percentage of total client asset value (Cappon, Manuel, & Mignot, 2007). For example, if
a client has $100,000 invested with Firm X, Firm X earns 1% of that value, or $1,000 per
year. If the client’s funds were reduced to $70,000 due to a market downturn, then, the
financial institution would earn $700 rather than $1,000.
This fee structure, dubbed as asset annuitization, is a departure from traditional
models of revenue generation based on transaction fees per securities trade (Cappon et
al., 2007). The trend toward asset annuitization has made client SIM beliefs a major
concern for the financial sector at the organization and industry level. Simultaneous
client sell-offs amidst market downturns can create a cycle of harm to the financial health
of an organization since retail brokerage institutions typically generate revenue based on
a percentage of total client securities holdings (Cappon et al., 2007). Therefore, when
market downturns reduce the value of those holdings, less revenue is generated. This
reduction in asset value due to a market downturn is exacerbated when clients sell
securities and hold cash. The combination of these two events at high levels—overall
reduced portfolio values and widespread security sell-offs—can threaten a financial
organization’s stability. If the organization is large enough, the negative ramifications
created by the market downturn and resulting client securities sell-offs can cause a ripple
effect through the entire financial sector, thus perpetuating the market downturn cycle
(Rotheli, 2007).
Despite the importance of SIM beliefs for individual investors, financial
institutions, and the financial sector as a whole, these beliefs are commonly threatened
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and subsequently violated by investors (Basu, Raj, & Tchalian, 2008; Gounaris & Prout,
2009; Ratajczak, 1999). As previously mentioned, SIM beliefs are violated when
investors make irrational decisions amidst turbulent market conditions or negative market
happenings. A great deal of research offers that investors act in an irrational and affectbased manner when faced with market downturns (Basu, et al., 2008; Dreman, 2004;
Nofsinger, 2005; Peterson, 2007; Ratajczak, 1999). Therefore, it is evident that existing
SIM beliefs are in many cases not able to sustain financial crises. For example, this
fallibility of SIM beliefs was seen in the financial crisis of 2008-2010. The market
turbulence from 2008-2010 resulted in record levels of sidelined cash, or money held in
cash to avoid market fluctuations (Bhaktavatsalam & Leondis, 2012).
The propensity towards emotional and irrational security sell-off decisions during
financial crisis leaves investors and financial institutions even more vulnerable to
financial harm during a crisis period. This risk of an irrational reaction to market events
(i.e., a breakdown of SIM beliefs) is further enhanced by the competing messages that
investors face during financial crises. Research (Hester & Gibson, 2003; Stevenson,
Gonzenbach, & David, 1994; Wu, Stevenson, Chen, & Guner, 2002) shows that media
outlets favor negative news during economic and financial crisis. For example, in an indepth analysis of the financial news of the 2001 financial crisis, Hester and Gibson found
that media outlets not only reported negative news more prominently, but
overwhelmingly framed negative news in a sensationalistic way.
To help insulate investors, financial advisors, retail brokerage firms, and the
financial industry as a whole from poor market conditions and coinciding bad marketrelated press a pre-emptive strategy should be implemented to protect SIM beliefs. Since
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investors are often making irrational financial decisions amidst crisis, financial
institutions have an opportunity to target investors with messages aimed to protect SIM
beliefs. Success of the protection messages would simultaneously prevent investors from
making decisions that would result in financial harm and insulate financial institutions
from the increased negative effects of client securities sell-offs during market downturns.
This study is not the first to suggest that a pre-emptive crisis management strategy
can help insulate organizations from forthcoming crises. For example, in a recent
conceptual work Kim (2013) suggested that “crisis communication is critical to a
corporation’s long-term success” (p. 293) and that consumer response to crisis could be
influenced with pre-crisis communication. Kim went on to suggest that corporate
advertising prior to crisis could have an inoculation effect by lessening the severity of
post-crisis consumer response to negative news.
Similar to Kim (2013), this paper also asserts that pre-emptive messages can
influence crisis effects. However, this work advances the proposition that messages
actually designed on the principles of inoculation theory can offer protection to
organizations during forthcoming crises. More specifically, it is argued that inoculation
messages offer an effective solution to the problem of SIM belief collapse during
financial crisis. This paper extends the conceptual suggestion (e.g., Kim, 2013) of an
“inoculation effect” of corporate advertising by testing inoculation messages in crisis
situations. Inoculation theory is built on the concept of two-sided messages, or those that
offer exposure to an opposing viewpoint as a way to foster resistance to persuasion
(Compton & Pfau, 2005; McGuire, 1961; 1964). Inoculation messages have shown
consistent efficacy during the past five decades to protect attitudes, opinions, beliefs,
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behavioral intentions, and values (henceforth only referred to as beliefs) against
persuasive attacks (see Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton, 2013; Compton & Pfau, 2005).
Therefore, a belief protection strategy built on inoculation theory offers a plausible
solution to the problem of SIM belief collapses during financial crises.
Inoculation Theory
As stated earlier in this study, inoculation messages are designed to generate
resistance to influence using two-sided messages (Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton &
Pfau, 2005). Inoculation theory was developed by social psychologist William McGuire
in the 1960s in response to a lack of research on how to generate resistance to persuasion
(Compton & Pfau, 2005). McGuire (1961; 1964) referred to previous work (Lumsdaine
& Janis, 1953) concerning war propaganda that suggested the use of two-sided messages,
or those that acknowledged likely counterpropaganda, were more effective than onesided messages. McGuire reasoned two-sided messages could also work to generate
resistance to persuasion and developed inoculation theory based on that logic. He
surmised that a weakened dose of an oppositional message would induce threat-elicited
motivation to generate defenses for effective counterarguing in an individual who would
then counterargue in support of his or her beliefs. The result, he posited, would be
resistance to persuasion generated through the mechanisms of threat and counterarguing.
McGuire tested his theory and found that inoculation could protect an individual’s initial
beliefs from persuasive attack (1961; 1962; 1964).
Since inoculation theory’s development, research has supported McGuire’s initial
view that inoculation theory functions as a result of two core mechanisms: threat and
counterarguing (Benoit, 1991; Compton & Pfau, 2005; Pfau et al., 1997). The threat
component of the inoculation message can be either explicit or implicit. Threat is
9

explicitly manipulated in the inoculation message by overtly warning individuals of the
vulnerability of the belief and indicating that likeminded peers have already succumbed
to the belief challenges (Compton, 2009; Compton & Ivanov, 2012). Threat is implicitly
manipulated when the belief’s vulnerability is shown by rendering the belief to weakened
counter-belief challenges in the inoculation message.
After threat is used to show vulnerability of a person’s beliefs, he or she should be
motivated to shore up defenses of the existing belief. The refutational preemption
component of the inoculation message—which presents counter-belief arguments and
disputations of those arguments—beside additional motivation also offers material and
guided practice for how to defend the established belief; namely by counterarguing
oppositional arguments. The combination of threat and the resulting process of
counterarguing are the mechanisms that are responsible for inoculation’s efficacy in
generating resistance to persuasion.
Threat is considered the foundational element of inoculation theory, with some
scholars arguing that “inoculation is impossible without threat” (Compton & Pfau, 2005,
pp. 100-101). Though the optimal level of threat that a message should elicit remains an
unanswered question (Compton, 2009), the accepted message design format attempts to
generate both explicit and implicit threat (Ivanov, 2011). Threat is perceived as the
catalyst of inoculation theory due to its ability to “trigger(s) people’s motivation to
defend their beliefs” (Wan & Pfau, 2004, p. 305). However, threat built into an
inoculation message requires the partnership with refutational preemption to complete the
inoculation process (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Pfau et al., 1997). Refutational preemption
is the act of raising opposing arguments to the person’s belief and then overwhelming
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those arguments with support for the existing attitude. McGuire (1964) initially
introduced refutational preemption as a way to offer guided practice at counterarguing, in
addition to providing specific evidence for the individual to use when constructing his or
her own counterarguments.
The vast amount of research on inoculation’s threat and counterarguing
mechanisms has established a standard format for constructing inoculation messages
(Ivanov, 2011). Messages designed to create the optimal amount of resistance to
persuasive attack should first use implicit and/or explicit threat to make the vulnerability
of an existing belief salient. Then the majority of the message should center on
refutational preemption, or introducing counterarguments to the current belief and then
overwhelming them with evidence in support of the belief. A standard inoculation
message typically ends with a call to action, or request for the person to maintain his or
her belief amidst persuasive attacks (Ivanov, 2011).
In addition to providing an in-depth explanation of inoculation’s core mechanisms
and establishing a standard message design format, inoculation research has
demonstrated a consistent ability to protect existing beliefs against persuasive attacks (see
Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005). Not only has a general functionality been
shown, but a vast amount of theoretical nuances and extensions have been identified. For
example, previous research has shown that the protection inoculation messages generate
can withstand multiple attacks (Ivanov, Pfau, & Parker, 2009a), can protect against novel
attacks, or those not explicitly addressed in the inoculation message (Banas & Rains,
2010; McGuire 1961; 1962; Pfau 1992; Wan & Pfau, 2004), and recent research (Parker,
Ivanov, & Compton, 2012) has shown that inoculation messages can protect beliefs about
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related but separate issues. Inoculation’s success has also been demonstrated in a variety
of contexts, namely corporate advertising and public relations (Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk,
1995; Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau, 1992; Pfau, Haigh, Sims, & Wigley, 2007; Pfau &
Wan, 2006), political campaigns (An & Pfau, 2004; Compton & Ivanov, 2013; Pfau &
Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990), adolescent health campaigns
(Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992; Pfau & Van Bockern, 1994),
differences in cultural message processing (Ivanov, Parker, Miller, & Pfau, 2012),
interpersonal communication (Sutton, 2011), instructional/educational communication
(Compton & Pfau, 2008), and crisis communication (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau,
2010).
Inoculation Theory and Crisis Communication
Some key findings from the body of work on inoculation theory make it a
particularly viable strategy for approaching crisis communication, and more specifically
the protection of SIM beliefs amidst financial crisis. The first is that inoculation can
protect against novel counterarguments (Banas & Rains, 2010; Pfau, 1992; McGuire
1961; 1962; Wan & Pfau, 2004). Novel counterarguments are counterarguments
included in a persuasive attack that were not specifically addressed in the preceding
inoculation message (Pfau, 1992). As Kim (2013) notes, organizations can “seldom
predict what sort of negative press they will be forced to defend themselves against” (p.
297).
The ability to protect against attacks not explicitly mentioned in the refutational
preemption component of the inoculation message makes room for practical utility since
– as other authors have noted (Kim, 2013) – practitioners often do not know the details of
the crisis situation, or attack, their organization will face. The chance to employ threat
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and refutational preemption without knowing the specific details of the attack in advance
give inoculation messages great applied potential. For example, a persuasive attack on
investors’ SIM beliefs could come in the form of an overall market downturn, an explicit
sell recommendation in mass media, or the witnessed sell actions of fellow investors.
Novel counterargument findings in inoculation research make inoculation messages a
strategy that would allow practitioners to use a single message to protect against these
various types of messages that could potentially threaten SIM beliefs.
Another reason inoculation messages are a valuable strategy for crisis
communication is their utility as a preemptive crisis communication strategy. Traditional
crisis communication approaches such as corporate apologia (Hearit, 2001), image
restoration (Benoit, 1997), situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 2007;
Coombs & Holladay 2001; 2002), and renewal discourse (Seeger, Ulmer, Novak, &
Sellnow, 2005; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2009; 2010) focus on the best way for
organizations to communicate with stakeholders following a crisis. However, inoculation
messages are designed for use in anticipation of an opposing message to a currently held
viewpoint (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Wigley & Pfau, 2010).
This preemptive nature of inoculation messages makes them valuable to crisis
communication, particularly in the context of protecting SIM beliefs. Due to the cyclical
nature of financial markets (Rotheli, 2007), financial institutions can expect to face
repeated attacks on SIM beliefs. A preemptive crisis communication strategy is needed
for all organizations (Kim, 2013), but financial institutions are particularly vulnerable
since perpetual financial crises can be anticipated (Rotheli, 2007). To echo the words of
seminal crisis communication authors Mitroff and Pearson (1993), “…it is no longer a
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question of whether a major crisis will strike any organization, it is only a matter of
when, which type and how" (p. 115). Employing inoculation messages as a preemptive
crisis communication strategy can offer financial institutions a much needed risk
management approach to protect SIM beliefs.
In addition to the ability of inoculation messages to protect against novel
counterarguments and their utility as a preemptive risk management strategy, a third
reason inoculation messages are ideal as a way to protect SIM beliefs are recent findings
(Ivanov et al., 2009a) that show inoculation’s ability to withstand multiple attacks. As
previously mentioned, financial institutions are not only certain to face an attack on SIM
beliefs, but those attacks will be repeated due to the cyclical nature of financial markets
(Rotheli, 2007). Therefore, inoculation’s efficacy in protecting against multiple attacks
can be extremely valuable to an organization likely to face perpetual crises.
The final aspect of inoculation messages that make them an ideal fit for use as a
crisis communication strategy is the exact, theoretically grounded message design
strategy established through decades of research on inoculation theory (Ivanov, 2011).
Inoculation messages can be used by practitioners to add maximum value since a
theoretically-grounded and experimentally tested message format is available as a guide
(Ivanov, 2011). The presence of a prescribed message format lessens the probability of
misinterpretation or misuse in the applied sphere.
Barriers to Inoculation Theory’s Application
This study addresses four potential barriers that could prevent inoculation’s
widespread use as a crisis communication strategy: the choice to not communicate at all,
the preference for supportive messages (one-sided messages that only express a
viewpoint in support of the existing belief) over inoculation messages, a lack of
14

understanding about the effects of inoculation on existing positive sentiment if a crisis
does not occur, and a lack of multimodal inoculation research that accurately simulates
real-world threat to existing beliefs (Compton & Pfau, 2005). The proceeding sections
address these four barriers and offer hypotheses and a test method designed to remove
these potential barriers to inoculation’s use through further theoretical testing.
Preference for no communication. The first barrier to inoculation’s use in the
applied sphere as addressed in this study is the choice of practitioners to not communicate
at all. The choice not to communicate in crisis can be made in the interest of keeping a
low profile (DeRiemer & Baxter, 1986), or as a result of communication spending cuts
during financial crisis. Research suggests that cuts in communication spending often
come early during periods of organizational financial stress (Picard, 2001; West, 2008).
This could mean that organizations are eliminating a vital resource that could help them
weather the crisis. In the case of retail brokerage institutions seeking to protect SIM
beliefs, avoiding crisis communication and a subsequent collapse of SIM beliefs could
enhance the crisis’ negative effects. Therefore, to facilitate widespread implementation
of a crisis communication strategy based on inoculation theory, practitioners need to be
assured that the cost of the communication with stakeholders via inoculation can result in
the protection of SIM beliefs, especially as compared with not communicating at all.
An extant study that focused on inoculation’s efficacy in crisis communication
compared inoculation messages to a no-message control group in an attempt to see which
resulted in greater pro-organizational attitude following a direct attack on the
organization’s reputation (Wigley & Pfau, 2010). Wigley and Pfau found that
participants exposed to inoculation messages rated the organization higher on six
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dimensions of corporate reputation as compared to the control group. The Wigley and
Pfau findings, combined with other research outside of the crisis context that
demonstrates inoculation’s superiority to a lack of communication (see Compton & Pfau,
2005), indicates that inoculation messages should protect SIM beliefs better than no
communication (and thus justify its costs of implementation). Therefore, it is
hypothesized that:
H1: Participants exposed to inoculation messages will report (a) higher SIM
beliefs and (b) greater certainty in the SIM beliefs following an attack message
indicating crisis than participants in the no-message control group.
Preference for a bolstering strategy. While some practitioners may choose to
not communicate at all during a crisis, others will likely choose a strategy that consists of
supportive messages over one that consists of inoculation messages (Compton & Pfau,
2005). In contrast to inoculation’s focus on integrating opposing arguments, supportive
messages are those that only contain material to reinforce or support the existing belief
(Wan & Pfau, 2004). Supportive strategies are often presented as a competing strategy
for inoculation-based campaigns (Ivanov et al., 2009a). Compton and Pfau argue that a
supportive strategy is more widely embraced due to an enhanced comfort level and
greater familiarity. They offer that, “people tend to prefer [a supportive strategy] and are
more inclined to use it to protect attitudes” (Compton & Pfau, p. 104).
In addition to a greater familiarity with supportive messages, another major
reason for not choosing an inoculation strategy might be perceived inherent risk. An
inoculation message strategy requires that practitioners make their organization’s
perceived weaknesses readily apparent to its stakeholders. When inoculation messages
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are used as a preemptive crisis communication strategy practitioners would be
highlighting potential future industry-wide challenges. For example, when using
inoculation messages to protect SIM beliefs – which is the focus of this study – the
inoculation message would foreshadow stock market downturns. Addressing negative
stakeholder events and coinciding concerns might deter practitioners from employing an
inoculation-based campaign. The sole positive focus of a supportive message strategy
could be perceived as a safer way to prepare for future crises.
Despite this increased comfort level with supportive messages, research that has
compared the efficacy of supportive messages to inoculation messages in protecting
existing beliefs (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; Ivanov, Pfau, & Parker, 2009b; McGuire
1961; 1962; McGuire & Papageogris 1961) has shown an inoculation strategy to be
superior. The inoculation literature upholds the claim that this superiority is due to a
supportive messages’ effect of leaving the recipient overconfident in her or her belief,
thus making the person susceptible to persuasive attack (McGuire, 1961; Wan & Pfau,
2004).
A parallel to the supportive message concept in inoculation literature is the
concept of a bolstering strategy in the crisis communication literature (Wan & Pfau,
2004). Wan and Pfau suggest that supportive inoculation treatments and bolstering
messages used in crisis communication “function in much the same manner” (p. 303).
Bolstering occurs when organizations communicate “only the good deeds…to reinforce
positive perception towards the firm” (Wan & Pfau, 2004, p. 303) prior to the onset of a
crisis. Bolstering has played a prominent role in the development of key crisis
communication strategies such as Coombs (2007) and Holladay’s (2001; 2002)

17

situational crisis communication theory.
Much like the preference for supportive messages noted by inoculation scholars
(Compton & Pfau, 2005), bolstering is a preferred strategy in crisis communication (Wan
& Pfau, 2004). Wan and Pfau offer that the preference for bolstering among crisis
communication scholars likely stems from the desire for “a positive organizationstakeholder relationship and organizations’ past good performances help to reduce
publics’ negative perception towards the company in the event of a crisis” (p. 303).
Another reason for the preference of bolstering to handle crisis situations is the
lack of research that has compared bolstering to an inoculation-based strategy. To date
only two studies (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) have explicitly compared a
bolstering to inoculation approach in the crisis communication context. Both of these
studies indicated that an inoculation and supportive approach equally protected attitudes
toward an organization following a crisis at a specific organization. In 2004 Wan and
Pfau hypothesized that while both supportive and inoculation treatments would confer
resistance to persuasion, inoculation messages would protect attitudes better than
supportive ones. They based their hypothesis on past research outside of the crisis
communication context (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; McGuire 1961; 1962; McGuire &
Papageogris 1961) that showed the superiority of inoculation messages to supportive
messages. Wan and Pfau tested their hypotheses in a three-phase experiment centering
on a hypothetical gas explosion at a well-known petroleum refinery. Attitudes about the
company were measured to assess the effectiveness of the experimental conditions.
However, despite the authors’ well-founded hypotheses, they found that supportive and
inoculation strategies equally conferred resistance to persuasion.
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Similarly, in 2010 Wigley and Pfau compared supportive and inoculation
messages and the resulting attitudes about six dimensions corporate reputation following
a well-known pet food company’s contamination crisis. Like Wan and Pfau (2004),
Wigley and Pfau found supportive and inoculation messages to equally confer resistance
to persuasion.
While both the of the studies (Wan and Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) that
have explicitly compared supportive to inoculation messages in the crisis communication
context have shown the two strategies to equally protect corporate attitudes, previous
research outside the crisis communication context (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; Ivanov
et al., 2009b; McGuire 1961; 1962; McGuire & Papageogris 1961) shows inoculation as
a superior strategy to supportive, or bolstering, messages. Some key differences between
the current study and previous crisis communication findings (Wan & Pfau 2004; Wigley
& Pfau 2010) suggest that, while the current study concerns crisis communication,
inoculation messages should show superiority to supportive messages in a manner
consistent with previous research outside the crisis communication context. The
similarities between this research and non-crisis inoculation research that has compared
supportive and inoculation messages to protect general beliefs are outlined in the
proceeding paragraph.
Both Wan and Pfau (2004) and Wigley and Pfau (2010) explored how a crisis at a
well-known company affected attitudes toward that company. However, the current
study focuses on SIM beliefs that exist independently of attitudes toward a specific
financial institution. This focus on the general belief rather than the actions of a specific
organization is more in line with previous research (McGuire, 1964; 1962, McGuire &
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Papageorgis, 1961) that has found inoculation to be a superior strategy to supportive
messages. For example, McGuire conducted his research program using general beliefs
he deemed “cultural truisms” such as brushing one’s teeth and visiting the doctor
regularly (1964). When inoculation and supportive strategies were used to protect these
beliefs from persuasive attack, inoculation messages showed superiority. Due to the
similarity with past research on protecting general beliefs, it is hypothesized that:
H2: Participants exposed to an inoculation message will report (a) higher SIM
beliefs and (b) greater certainty in the SIM beliefs following an attack message
than participants who are exposed to a supportive-only message.
Inoculation messages in absence of crisis. Another barrier to inoculation’s use
as an organizational crisis communication strategy, in addition to preference for not
communicating at all or using a supportive strategy, is the apprehension that inoculation
messages will harm positive stakeholder sentiment if a crisis does not occur. In the
context of protecting SIM beliefs during crisis, the threat component of the inoculation
message would stimulate counterarguing by highlighting the fact that other investors
have panicked due to market fluctuations and stopped doing business with their
organizations. In addition, the refutational preemption component of the inoculation
message would introduce possible oppositional viewpoints (e.g., securities may decline
so far in value that they cannot recover) prior to providing evidence to overwhelm the
oppositional viewpoint. Such an expose' of SIM belief weaknesses is a source of
discomfort, and thus a barrier to use, for any practitioner considering use of an
inoculation strategy. Though, in the context of retail investing, market downturns will
inevitably occur (Rotheli, 2007), those downturns might not reach crisis level within
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close proximity to the inoculation treatment. Thus, inoculation’s integration of
oppositional viewpoints presents an inherent risk to SIM beliefs.
Both of the studies (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) that have
conceptualized persuasive attacks as a crisis situation and studied inoculation as a
stakeholder perception protection strategy have investigated this potential downside to
inoculation’s use. Wigley and Pfau (2010) compared inoculation and control groups and
found that, when compared to no communication, inoculation treatments did not harm
attitudes towards an organization in absence of a crisis. In fact, Wigley and Pfau found
that in some dimensions of corporate reputation (e.g., financial performance), inoculation
treatments actually boosted attitudes. Since inoculation has been shown to work equally
well with attitudes and beliefs (Compton & Pfau, 2005), it is hypothesized that:
H3: Participants exposed to an inoculation message will not report (a) lower SIM
beliefs and (b) lower certainty in the SIM beliefs in absence of an attack message
compared to participants exposed to a control message.
Like Wigley and Pfau (2010), Wan and Pfau (2004) also investigated a no-crisis
condition. However, Wan and Pfau compared inoculation messages to supportive ones
rather than a control group (due to a lack of power) in absence of crisis. Wan and Pfau’s
findings indicated that, as compared to supportive messages, inoculation messages may
not protect attitudes as well in absence of crisis. In their study, supportive messages
resulted in stronger pro-organizational attitudes than inoculation messages in absence of
crisis. Better performance in absence of a crisis could lead practitioners to use a
supportive strategy rather than one based on inoculation.
However, recent research regarding cultural message processing (Ivanov, Parker,
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Miller et al., 2012) indicates that the Wan and Pfau findings could be due to their use of
Chinese participants. Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al. found that not only is culture a
moderator of inoculation’s success, but that the collectivist mentality that predominates
Asian cultures can weaken the effects of inoculation messages as compared with the
effects of inoculation messages on members of an individualistic (e.g., American)
culture. A collectivist culture is one in which members engage in an “internally tense
struggle to find equilibrium between the desire for ingroup assimilation and individuation
from it” (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012, p. 6). As a consequence of this collectivist
mentality and the corresponding inclination towards equilibrium, members of collectivist
cultures tend to evaluate both sides of a two-sided message equally even in cases such as
inoculation messages where one side of the argument is presented as the stronger
argument (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012).
In Asian cultures the need for harmony may lead to a desire for balance within a
two-sided message. Therefore, the collectivist mentality can move members of Asian
cultures to assign both sides of the argument presented in an inoculation message equal
credence even though the evidence on one side of the argument is stronger. Since
inoculation messages are designed to protect existing beliefs, an equal weighting of the
sides of the argument may move individuals toward the middle of the argument and away
from their original belief or at the minimum fail to strengthen the existing belief. Thus, a
collectivist mentality may actually move inoculated individuals away from the advocated
position. Therefore, the Wan and Pfau (2004) findings that show performance of
inoculation messages as less effective than supportive messages may be a product of
cultural differences between Asian cultures and American culture (Ivanov, Parker, Miller
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et al., 2012), the culture in which the majority of inoculation studies have been
conducted.
In contrast, individualistic cultures such as the United States should respond more
favorably to unbalanced two-sided messages that have a clear strong and weak side to the
argument (e.g., inoculation messages) (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012). Individuals in
individualistic cultures tend to evaluate the merits of both sides of an argument presented
in an inoculation message without the slant towards equilibrium found in collectivist
cultures (Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al., 2012). Therefore, when members of an
individualistic culture are presented with an inoculation message they tend to recognize
and accept the stronger position (i.e., the advocated message).
The differences in American and Asian message processing are an important
consideration when assessing the Wan and Pfau (2004) findings that show supportive
messages protecting attitudes better than inoculation messages in absence of a crisis.
Since Asian (i.e., collectivist) participants were used in the Wan and Pfau study, the
Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al. (2012) findings indicate that Wan and Pfau’s sample should
have responded less favorably to a two-sided message strategy such as inoculation. The
Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al. (2012) findings also support the great deal of research that
shows inoculation message superiority to supportive message with use of American
research participants (Anderson & McGuire, 1965; McGuire 1961; 1962; McGuire &
Papageorgis 1961). Therefore, when supportive and inoculation messages are compared
in the absence of crisis using American research participants, inoculation messages
should protect beliefs as well or better than supportive messages. The explanation of the
Wan and Pfau (2004) findings based on the research by Ivanov, Parker, Miller et al.
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(2012), together with the Wigley and Pfau (2010) findings that show inoculation does not
harm attitudes in absence of crisis, support the following hypothesis:
H4: Participants exposed to an inoculation message will not report (a) lower SIM
beliefs and (b) lower certainty in the SIM beliefs in absence of an attack message
compared to participants exposed to a supportive message.
Impact of crisis communication medium. In addition to a lack of
communication, a preference for supportive messages, and apprehension about
inoculation’s effects in absence of crisis, the fourth barrier to inoculation’s use as a crisis
communication strategy results from a gap in inoculation research. Until this point
inoculation research has largely treated communication medium “as a ‘neutral’ conduit of
message content” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195). Because of this assumption the “overwhelming
majority of inoculation studies have used print treatments” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195).
However, based on a large body of work that asserts a major effect of the medium on the
message (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 1983; Cheseboro, 1984; McGinnies, 1965; McLuhan,
1967; Meyrotwitz 1985, 1994; Salomon, 1987; Wiegman, 1989, Worchel, Andreoli, &
Eason, 1975), this underlying assumption in inoculation research is likely overlooking a
key factor. The importance of understanding the impact of the communication medium
on the message is even more pertinent in light of the current multi-faceted media
landscape (Quandt & von Pape, 2010). In the context of protecting SIM beliefs, it is a
near certainty that investors will face an attack message through a variety of media forms
(Vitt, 2004). If practitioners develop a strategy based on research that has tested
inoculation’s efficacy using a print attack and print inoculation treatment, it cannot be
safely assumed that the findings will translate when SIM beliefs are attacked through
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other, more interactive media.
At this point only one study (Pfau, Holbert, Zubric, Pasha, & Lin, 2000) has
explicitly addressed communication medium’s potential as a relevant variable in
inoculation theory. Pfau et al. tested the impact of print versus video inoculation
treatments and found them to equally confer resistance to persuasion. However, while
print and video inoculation treatments may equally generate threat and counterarguing,
and thus resistance to persuasion, it is possible that a persuasive attack communicated
through various media forms could affect the generated resistance differently. Attack
messages have varied in strength of impact due to other factors, such as source attributes
(Miller et al., 2013; Pfau et al., 2000). Since attack message variables have been shown
to impact inoculation’s success, but have been less studied than inoculation message
variables, presentation format of the attack message could change inoculation’s
effectiveness. Other studies (An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003; Pfau,
Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992) have substituted inoculation or attack video treatments for
the standard print format since communication medium has been assumed to have no
impact. Therefore, at this point no research has explicitly compared the impact of print
and video attacks on inoculation’s ability to protect beliefs.
As previously mentioned, a large body of work contrasts inoculation theorists’
view of communication medium “as a ‘neutral’ conduit of message content” (Pfau, 1990,
p. 195). This body of work is collectively called medium theory (Meyrowitz, 1985;
1994). Medium theorists argue that a message’s impact is greatly affected by the
medium through which it is communicated (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 1983; Cheseboro,
1984; McGinnies, 1965; McLuhan, 1967; Meyrotwitz 1985, 1994; Salomon, 1987;
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Wiegman, 1989, Worchel, et al., 1975). Medium theory posits that each communication
medium carries a unique symbol system because it bears a history of the social and
cultural change it created. Leading medium theorist Meyrowitz (1994) offered:
Most of the questions that engage media researchers and popular observers of the
media focus only on…the content of media messages…medium theory examines
such variables as the senses that are required to attend to the medium, whether the
communication is bi-directional or uni-directional, how quickly messages can be
disseminated, whether learning how to encode or decode in the medium is
difficult or simple, how many people can attend to the same message at the same
moment…such variables can influence medium’s use and its social, political, and
psychological impact. (p. 50)
One intriguing aspect of medium theory as it relates to inoculation theory is the
way it conceptualizes passive and active media forms. In the scope of medium theory,
multi-modal communication forms (i.e. those that engage multiple senses, such as
television’s combination of audio and visual cues) are considered engaging due to the
“simultaneity of action, perception, and reaction” (Meyrowitz, 1994, p. 57). In contrast,
according to medium theory uni-modal media forms such as print (that only requires
reading) are considered flat. These flat media forms are less engaging and thus more
passive than multi-modal communication formats that require multi-sensory engagement.
Christou (2009) offered:
Consider the book. A book is a single-user, at-will experience, enabling frequent
rereads of any individual piece of the content, within a relatively simple one-onone interaction and only requiring that the user have the ability to read.
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Television, on the other hand, requires more effort on behalf of the viewer to
understand and interpret meaning since it requires the more extensive use of
visual and audio senses. (p. 7)
This conception of multi-modal communication forms as more active than a
traditional print format is a departure from the dominant view. Most mass media scholars
(Krugman, 1965; McQuail, 2010) consider print a more active media form due to the
cognitive processes required to read and process content. In contrast to medium theorists,
some mass media theorists would argue that multi-modal forms such as television can be
consumed more passively than print since they do not require active cognitive processing
such as reading (Biocca, 1988; Krugman, 1965; McQuail, 2010).
Though both conceptions of active and passive media forms – television as more
active (Meyrowitz, 1985; 1994; McLuhan, 1967) and print as more active (Krugman,
1965) – offer strong arguments, research in the inoculation context offers empirical
evidence that supports medium theorists’ view of television as a more engaging and
active media form than print. As previously mentioned, some inoculation studies (An &
Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003; Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992) have
substituted video inoculation and attack messages in the course of testing other concepts
since communication medium has been considered “a ‘neutral’ conduit of message
content” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195). Interestingly, when assessing the results of these studies
retrospectively through the lens of medium theory, several of the findings support
medium theory’s conception of video as a more active, engaging media form than print.
For example, Godbold and Pfau (2000) found that the resistance to persuasion
generated by video inoculation messages did not withstand persuasive attack by a video
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attack message. Similarly, in the course of testing inoculation’s ability to generate
resistance to persuasion contained in televised political debates, An and Pfau (2004)
found that an overall demise in participatory spirit occurred when participants were
inoculated with print treatments and presented with a video attack message. In contrast,
Nabi (2003) found strong results for inoculation’s effectiveness when she constructed a
visually stimulating inoculation message rather than a typical “talking head” (p. 202)
video format. When presented with a video attack message, Nabi found that the
resistance generated through the stimulating inoculation message was able to sustain
persuasive attack. Taken together, these three studies (An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold &
Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003) support medium theory’s conception of video as a more
engaging media form than print.
In addition to the ancillary findings by Godbold and Pfau (2000), An and Pfau
(2004), and Nabi (2003), Pfau and colleagues (2006; 2008) have explicitly studied the
emotionally evocative power of visual images and inoculation’s impact on emotional
response to images. In 2006 (a), Pfau, Haigh, Fifrick, and colleagues compared still
images of war casualties to a text report of those casualties and found that still images
had a greater ability to elicit negative feelings towards war. When the researchers
attempted to inoculate participants against the negative emotions elicited by visual
images using a print treatment, inoculation showed very small effect sizes and only had
an effect on women.
Similarly, in 2008 Pfau, Haigh, Shannon, and colleagues continued research on
the evocative power of visuals by comparing televised news reports of war (i.e., featuring
footage) and televised anchor reports of war. Pfau et al. (2008) found that, when shown
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war footage, participants reported higher issue involvement levels and less favorability
towards the war effort than when they were shown an anchor report only. More
importantly, however, neither print only nor print with photograph inoculation treatments
were able to generate resistance against an attack in the form of a video report with war
footage. Taken together, both of the Pfau et al. (2006; 2008) studies support medium
theorists’ view that more sensory forms involved in a media form result in more audience
engagement.
While the aforementioned studies (An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000;
Nabi, 2003; Pfau et al. 2006; 2008) support medium theorists’ conception of television as
a more engaging media form than print, they do not answer the question of whether or
not more engagement will lead to more impact on the inoculation process. However,
previous research (Mazzocco, 2000; Mazzoco & Brock, 2006) indicates that consuming a
combination of print and visual images requires more cognitive resources, which would
leave less available resources for generating resistance (i.e., assessing threat and
generating counterarguments). Regarding the work of Mazzoco and colleagues, Ivanov
et al. (2009a) offered, “[A] brief look at the cognitive resources models of how
information is processed, stored, and retrieved, would indicate that processing both
images and text may consume more resources than processing only images or text” (p.
662).
The cognitive resources required to process print and text distracts individuals
from the cognitive processes required to effectively receive an inoculation treatment.
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty, Cacioppo, & Kasmer,
1988) distraction can impair an individual’s ability to process information. Therefore, an
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attack message featuring both images and spoken or written text can distract the
individual from counterarguing, thus lowering his or her conferred resistance.
Since the medium through which a message is consumed should have a
considerable impact on its meaning (Chaiken & Eagly, 1976, 1983; Cheseboro, 1984;
McGinnies, 1965; McLuhan, 1967; Meyrotwitz 1985, 1994; Salomon, 1987; Wiegman,
1989, Worchel, et al., 1975), it is concerning that the media through which an attack
media is presented has not been explicitly addressed in inoculation research. The lack of
understanding about how the attack communication medium will impact an inoculation
message’s effectiveness represents a significant research gap. In the context of SIM
beliefs, investors are consuming various media forms. If those media vary in their ability
to overwhelm the protection created by a print inoculation message, it is an important
consideration for practitioners using an inoculation strategy. Therefore, in the first
inoculation study to explicitly compare attack media forms, the following hypothesis is
posited based on medium theory and previous inoculation research that has combined
print and video formats and shown the strength of audiovisual media forms as compared
to print:
H5: Participants who receive an inoculation message then are exposed to a crisis
message presented through video will report (a) lower SIM beliefs and (b) lower
certainty in the SIM beliefs compared to participants exposed to a crisis message
through print.
Post-Inoculation Talk
In addition to the four relevant barriers to inoculation’s use – a preference for no
communication, preference for a bolstering strategy, a lack of understanding about how
inoculation messages will function in absence of crisis, and a research gap concerning the
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impact of crisis communication medium – addressed in the preceding hypotheses, this
study also seeks to understand the impact of post-inoculation talk (henceforth referred to
as PIT) on the inoculation process. Until recently inoculation theorists have considered
inoculation to be a subvocal process and have therefore focused on internal processes and
individual difference variables mediating intrapersonal communication (Compton &
Pfau, 2009). However, in 2009 Compton and Pfau argued that the unsettling nature of
inoculation’s threat and refutation preemption components might motivate inoculated
individuals to discuss the issue with others and thereby strengthen generated resistance.
The recent suggestion that inoculation might have interpersonal components in
addition to the extensively studied intrapersonal processes such as threat and
counterarguing (see Compton & Pfau, 2005) could have significant implications in the
context of inoculating investors against SIM belief collapses during market turbulence.
For example, Compton and Pfau (2009) suggested that not only could interpersonal
conversations affect generated resistance, but that inoculation treatments could actually
be spread through social networks. While Compton and Pfau’s suggestion that
inoculation treatments could spread through interpersonal conversation has not been
explicitly addressed in inoculation research, Ivanov and colleagues (2012) found that PIT
functioned as both reassurance for and advocacy of the inoculated individuals’ positions.
They also posited that, “PIT might additionally function as a type of booster treatment”
(Ivanov et al., 2012, p. 26). If investors engage in PIT with other investors about keeping
money in the market (i.e., maintaining SIM beliefs), those conversations might strengthen
their own and others’ SIM beliefs.
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In the most extensive study on PIT, Ivanov, Miller and colleagues (2012)
conducted research to assess the impact of PIT on generated resistance. Ivanov, Miller et
al. found that “…inoculation generates more talk, and talk contributes to resistance.
Inoculated individuals are more likely to engage in the process of issue-related PIT more
often and with more conversational partners compared to those not exposed to the
inoculation message” (2012, pp. 16-17). Ivanov et al. also found a positive relationship
between generated threat, PIT (both frequency and amount), and resistance. The findings
of Ivanov, Miller and colleagues (2012) support Compton and Pfau’s (2009) argument
that the vast amount of research that has focused on inoculation as an intrapersonal
process may have overlooked the impact of interpersonal conversation about inoculation
issues.
The recent findings unveiling the possibility of both vocal and subvocal
components of the inoculation process (Ivanov et al., 2012; Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012)
call for more research to identify the role each plays in conferring resistance. For
example, while Ivanov, Miller and colleagues (2012) found that vocal processes led to
higher resistance, does that mean vocal counterarguing supplants subvocal (i.e., internal)
processes? If so, four decades of progress toward understanding how inoculation works
is largely untenable. Or, is internal, subvocal resistance merely enhanced by the vocal
PIT process? If this is the case, rather than supplanting existing research, more work
regarding PIT can enhance what scholars already know about generating resistance
through inoculation.
To begin the process of understanding vocal processes on inoculation, further
work needs to attempt to isolate internal, subvocal processes and their effect on generated
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resistance. Examining the link between subvocal processes and generated resistance can
help clarify the large body of work that suggests the ability of subvocal inoculation
processes to generate resistance. This study will attempt to isolate subvocal inoculation
processes by providing participants an inoculation message that, at the end, asks them not
to engage in PIT between experimental phases.
Though this study does ask participants to not talk about the issue between
experimental phases, the inoculation message format will not be substantially different
from messages used in other inoculation studies (Ivanov, 2011). The request to not
engage in PIT will only be one sentence at the end of the inoculation message. Given the
great number of instances of similarly formatted inoculation messages (see Compton &
Pfau, 2005) in generating resistance to persuasion, merely asking participants to refrain
from talking to others about their SIM beliefs should not nullify the inoculation-generated
resistance. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that:
H6: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they not engage in
PIT will report (a) higher SIM beliefs and (b) higher certainty in the SIM beliefs
compared to participants in the control condition.
As hypothesized above, the internal process previously thought to be wholly
responsible for inoculation’s ability to generate resistance should still offer some
resistance. However, as previously mentioned, recent findings Ivanov et al. (2012)
indicate a link between PIT and strengthened resistance. Therefore, participants who
engage in PIT should report more resistance than those who engage solely in subvocal
process. Since participants in the Ivanov et al. (2012) study reported PIT following a
standard inoculation message, this study hypothesizes that:
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H7: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they not engage in
PIT will report (a) lower SIM beliefs and (b) lower certainty in the SIM beliefs
compared to participants exposed to the same inoculation message without
mention of PIT.
Since research (Ivanov et al., 2012, Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012) has shown that
PIT leads to greater resistance, a valuable avenue for future research is to determine
whether or not PIT can be artificially boosted. If an inoculation message that concludes
with a request for individuals to discuss the issue as much as possible can boost PIT and
thereby resistance, this finding can strengthen the inoculation efforts of financial
institutions using an inoculation strategy to protect SIM beliefs. Since previous research
has shown a link between PIT and enhanced resistance, it is hypothesized that:
H8: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they engage in
PIT will report (a) higher SIM beliefs and (b) higher certainty in the SIM beliefs
compared to participants exposed to same inoculation message without mention
of PIT.
H9: Participants exposed to an inoculation message asking that they engage in
PIT will report (a) higher SIM beliefs and (b) higher certainty in the SIM beliefs
compared to participants exposed to same inoculation message asking that they
not engage in PIT.
Gain and Loss Frame Inoculation Messages
Since Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal article on Prospect Theory (PT),
the findings that “losses loom larger than gains” (Rick, 2010, p. 454) have been repeated
robustly in a variety of contexts. PT offers that individuals will not always make
decisions in a rational manner, and that the way a decision choice is presented (i.e.,
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framed as a potential gain or as a potential loss) can promote or reduce risk aversion
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rick, 2010). Specifically, PT has shown over time that
emphasizing potential losses can lead individuals to display enhanced risk aversion.
Regarding the way PT influences decision making under risk, Rick (2010) offers that “In
risky contexts, loss aversion can help to explain widespread risk aversion” (p. 454).
To date PT has not been studied alongside inoculation theory, despite the
potential of enhancing inoculation’s effects in risk-based contexts through gain and loss
message framing. However, three inoculation studies have explored similar concepts. In
2010 Bizer, Larsen, and Petty tested valence framing in the context of political decision
making. Bizer et al. found that “framing a person’s attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a
rejected position such as anti-Democrat) led to more resistance…than did framing the
same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as pro-Republican)” (p.
59). However, the political context of Bizer et al.’s study disallowed two prerequisites of
PT: a risk-oriented context and a clear gain and loss scenario. Therefore, Bizer et al.’s
findings cannot be considered a demonstration of PT as it relates to inoculation theory.
Similarly, in a 2011 unpublished study Mason and Miller assessed the effect of
positive-outcome and negative-outcome focused inoculation messages regarding goaloriented healthy food choices. The authors found that:
Compared to both control and positive outcome focus, participants who received a
negative outcome-focused inoculation treatment were found to hold more
negative attitudes toward the attacking source, perceived greater levels of threat,
and generated elevated levels of counterarguments. Messages which employed
negative outcome focus motivated participants to engage in a state of vigilance in
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anticipation of an expected counter-attitudinal attack (threat) and were able to
confer the most resistance. (Mason & Miller, 2011, p. 32)
In 2009, as part of larger study on the role of affect in inoculation, Pfau and
colleagues also found that a negative message frame enhanced the inoculation process.
However, the Pfau et al. (2009) study was more similar to PT’s focus on gain and loss
message framing than the two previously mentioned studies (Bizer et al., 2010; Mason &
Miller, 2011) that also explored negatively framed inoculation messages. Pfau and
colleagues examined affective-positive (i.e., happy) inoculation messages and affectivenegative (i.e., angry) inoculation messages. Consistent with previous affect-based
inoculation research (e.g., Pfau et al., 2001), Pfau et al. (2009) conceptualized affecteliciting messages as those that centered on goal attainment. Pfau and colleagues (2009)
relied on the logic supporting Lazarus’ Appraisal Theory that states, “goal attainment or
obstruction is key to the appraisal process and to elicited affect” (p. 80). Pfau et al.
further posited that, “[A]ffect triggers signal that goals may be facilitated (affective
positive messages) or thwarted (affective negative messages)” (p. 78). Pfau et al. used
statistically and research-based evidence, but framed the evidence in terms of goals to
represent an affect-based message. Therefore, the positive and negative message framing
used by Pfau et al. (2009) was similar to PT’s gain and loss message framing in that the
messages used by Pfau and colleagues hinged on goal attainment. Though the affectivenegative messages did not generate higher levels of resistance as an outcome, the results
did indicate that the affective-negative messages impacted the process of resistance (Pfau
et al., 2009). Participants in the affective-negative condition reported higher levels of
counterarguing than those in the affective-positive condition.
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Thus, all three studies that have explored negative message framing in tandem
with inoculation – Bizer et al. (2010), Mason and Miller (2011), and Pfau et al. (2009) –
have shown the strength of negative message framing. While these studies do not
directly address financial loss framing, which is a direct application of PT in its original
form, they do indicate that negative message framing is more impactful than positive
message framing. Findings related to this very similar concept (i.e., negative message
framing) can be taken as a strong indication that PT related to financial losses and gains
should replicate in the context of inoculating against SIM belief collapses.
The long history of findings in support of PT (see Rick, 2010) has significant
implications for the present study on the role of inoculation messages in protecting SIM
beliefs. SIM beliefs and the crisis scenarios that could challenge SIM beliefs present an
ideal risk-laden and financial-oriented context for use of gain and loss frame messaging.
In addition, participants can easily understand gain and loss frame messages relating to
selling securities during a market downturn. Thus, inoculation message designed to elicit
threat to SIM beliefs have a valuable opportunity to employ either a gain or loss frame.
Per PT, inoculation messages employing a loss frame (i.e., emphasizing that funds could
be lost by selling securities during a market downturn) should enhance risk aversion
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rick, 2010). In this context, the enhancement of risk
aversion is a reduced SIM belief because staying in the market during a downturn is
unpredictable while selling securities yields a known amount of cash and prevents further
losses. In contrast, per PT inoculation messages employing a gain frame (i.e.,
emphasizing that funds can be gained by keeping money in the market in anticipation of a
market upturn) should reduce risk aversion. In this context reduced risk aversion means
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stable or increased SIM beliefs since to stay in the market during a downturn means
greater acceptance of uncertainty about market movements (i.e., risk). Therefore, based
on PT it is hypothesized that:
H10: Participants exposed to loss framed inoculation messages will report (a)
higher SIM beliefs and (b) greater certainty in the SIM beliefs compared to
participants exposed to gain framed inoculation messages.

Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD
This investigation employed a 3 (experimental message: inoculation/supportive/
control) x 2 (crisis/no crisis) between subjects factorial design. Four additional
conditions were also added. Two conditions assessed the impact of PIT (PIT/no PIT).
These conditions each consisted of an additional sentence at the end of the standard
inoculation message. The “PIT” message instructed participants to discuss the issue with
as many people as possible while the “no PIT” message instructed participants to discuss
the issue of SIM beliefs with no one (see “Message Construction” section for further
details). One condition was added to compare a gain frame inoculation message to the
primary inoculation message that was designed as a loss frame message, and a video
crisis condition was added to compare the effects of print and video attacks on
inoculation’s effectiveness.
Message Construction
Inoculation and supportive messages. This study employed a total of four print
inoculation messages: the primary inoculation message (employing a loss frame), a gain
frame inoculation message, an inoculation message that explicitly asked participants to
engage in PIT (PIT), and a message that explicitly asked participants not to participate in
PIT (no PIT). One supportive message was used in this study.
Each of the inoculation messages began with a paragraph designed to elicit threat
in the participant through an explicit forewarning of an impending attack on beliefs. Due
to the importance of threat in the inoculation process (Compton, 2009; Compton & Pfau,
2005), inoculation messages typically begin with threat activation (Ivanov, 2011).
Therefore, the threat component of the messages was manipulated and tested in a pilot
study to assess its effectiveness in generating threat. An independent sample t-test
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indicated that, though not statistically significant, the inoculation message (M = 3.65, SD
= 1.35, n = 27) did generate higher threat levels than the supportive message (M = 3.35,
SD = 1.64, n = 28). Following the pilot study the inoculation message was slightly
altered to serve two purposes: to enhance the threatening language and to ensure message
equivalence with the other messages used in this study (see description of message
equivalency procedures later in this section).
The second and third paragraphs were designed to support the opposition to the
SIM belief and then refute each of those oppositional statements. To test the gain and
loss frame inoculation messages, the refutational preemption component of the message
was designed to overwhelm the oppositional argument with either an emphasis on the
money that could be made by staying in the market (gain frame) or the money that could
be lost by violating SIM beliefs and selling off (loss frame). The PIT-related messages
ended with a sentence either asking participants to engage in PIT or asking them to not
engage in PIT. The supportive message consisted only of material designed to
strengthen, or bolster, existing SIM beliefs.
Pursuant to previous inoculation research that recognizes the importance of
language in message outcome variables (Wan & Pfau, 2004), message equivalency for
the supportive and inoculation treatments was calculated using Becker, Bavelas, and
Braden’s (1961) index of contingency. This index accounts for the total message length,
average paragraph length, and number of nouns to “assess the comprehensibility of
messages” (Wan & Pfau, p. 312). Messages receiving similar index scores indicate
equivalence. The messages used in this investigation received the following index
scores: inoculation loss frame – 9.5, inoculation gain frame – 9.2, and supportive – 10.0.
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The index scores of these messages indicate relative equivalence. Identical font size and
layout was also used for each of the messages.
Attack messages. This study tested two attack message formats. The same
content was presented as video and as print to maintain consistency among participants in
each condition. Similar to Wan and Pfau (2004) and Wigley and Pfau (2010), the attack
message in this study was a report of a crisis situation. However, unlike the other two
studies that have used inoculation in a crisis communication context (Wan & Pfau, 2004;
Wigley & Pfau, 2010), the crisis message in this study did not focus on events at a certain
organization. Rather, the crisis that served as the attack message in this study was a
report of a major market downturn and coinciding widespread sell-offs.
In addition to a crisis and no-crisis condition, this study also attempted to
understand how print and video attack messages vary inoculation’s effectiveness.
Therefore, both the print and video crisis condition appeared to come from a widely
known, politically neutral news organization (CNN) that features both print and broadcast
outlets. A visually engaging video broadcast news story, consistent with the work of
Pfau and colleagues (2008) that showed the effectiveness of issue-related footage, was
chosen. The video did not mention a specific company or market event but instead
focused on widespread stock market sell-offs. Then, a print version of the video news
story was created using similar language and aesthetics.
Due to the exploratory nature of video attack messages in inoculation research,
the video attack message used in this study was pre-tested in a pilot study for its ability to
threaten SIM beliefs. In a control group that received neither a supportive nor
inoculation message, belief levels and belief certainty were captured before and after
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viewing the video attack message. A paired sample t-test indicated that SIM beliefs were
significantly lower for participants after viewing the video attack message than before (M
= -.86, SD = 1.4, n = 52, t = -4.42, p < .01). The certainty level of the beliefs also
decreased significantly following the video attack (M = -80.1, SD = 22.85, n = 52, t = 25.27, p < .01).
Participants
Participants were recruited from the research system at the University of
Kentucky that consists of undergraduate (primarily first year) communication students in
required communication general education courses. All participants were randomly
assigned to the experimental conditions in the study.
While the use of college students was a convenience sample, presumed student
lack of investing experience is a major benefit to the validity of the study results. A
number of actual investors presumably experienced a loss of funds due to the turbulence
in the financial markets in 2008-2010 (Craig, McCracken, Lucchetti, & Kelly, 2008).
People who actually lost money would not have the ability to objectively process
financial crisis reports, which would skew the findings of this study.
Therefore, since this study was the first time several of the hypotheses were tested
in an experimental setting, participants needed to be as similar with regard to investing
experience as possible. As such, college age participants were mature enough to see the
value in adopting SIM beliefs but lacked a great deal of direct investing experience. In
phase one of this investigation investing experience was measured on a one to seven scale
where one indicated “no experience” and seven indicated “a lot of experience” to confirm
lack of investing experience. The mean investing experience score for all of the
participants in this study was 1.88. For these reasons college students offered an
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exemplar population for this study. This investigation generated a sample size of 513
participants. The sample size yielded over 50 participants per cell in the ten cell design
(3 [inoculation/supportive/control] x 2 [crisis/no crisis] + 4 [PIT/noPIT/video crisis/gain
frame inoculation]). The average sample per cell size for inoculation studies ranges from
20-40 participants (see Banas & Rains, 2010). Therefore, this study had an above
average number of participants per cell.
Procedures
The data collection for this study required three phases. All data were collected
online using Qualtrics survey software during the spring 2013 semester. Online data
collection was used in this study to boost attrition rates. The ease of data collection and
organization was also increased with an online format, similar to past inoculation
research (Ivanov, Miller et al., 2012).
Participants could begin phase one at any point from the beginning of the spring
2013 semester until six weeks before the end of the semester. The enrollment of new
participants was cut off six weeks prior to the end of the semester so that participants
would have time to complete all three phases of the study, which were separated by two
weeks (description to follow). During phase one participants were exposed to material
designed to generate SIM beliefs by emphasizing all of the financial benefits of a buy and
hold, long-term investment strategy. Participants then reported SIM belief level and
certainty. In addition to reporting SIM beliefs and certainty, participants in phase one
also completed two measures designed to capture variables that served as covariates in
this investigation: initial involvement level and risk aversion propensity.
Access to phase two was provided to participants two weeks after completion of
phase one. During phase two, participants either received an inoculation message
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(primary [loss frame], gain frame, PIT, or no PIT), a supportive message, or were
assigned to the no message control group. Following the inoculation, supportive, or no
message administration, a threat manipulation check was performed across all conditions.
Access to phase three was provided to participants two weeks after completion of
phase two. Participants either randomly received an attack message in the form of a print
or video crisis or did not receive an attack message at all (no crisis scenario). Following
the crisis condition (or lack thereof for the no-crisis control group), participants were
again asked to report their SIM belief level and certainty. Counterarguing output was
captured during the final phase as well.
Independent Variables
Experimental condition. The inoculation, supportive, and control conditions
were manipulated during phase two as previously described. To maintain consistency
among the experimental conditions the inoculation, control, and supportive messages
were presented as print. However, unlike the print attack condition that was an online
news story, the supportive and inoculation conditions were presented as plain text. Two
of the ten groups did not receive a message (controls), two of the ten treatment groups
received a supportive message, and the remaining six treatment groups received an
inoculation message. Of the six inoculation treatment groups, three received the primary
(loss frame) inoculation message, one received the gain frame inoculation message, one
received the inoculation message with explicit instructions to engage in PIT, and one
received the inoculation message with explicit instructions to not engage in PIT.
Crisis scenario. Hypotheses three and four were designed to understand the
effects of various treatment messages (i.e., inoculation, supportive, and control) in
absence of a crisis. Therefore, not all participants received a crisis scenario in phase
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three. Additionally, for the primary (loss frame) inoculation message, a portion of the
participants received a video crisis rather than a print crisis. In phase three, of
participants who received a supportive treatment or no treatment control, half received a
print crisis and the other half did not receive a crisis. For the participants who received
the primary (loss frame) inoculation message, one third did not receive a crisis, one third
received a print crisis, and one third received a video crisis. The gain frame, PIT, and no
PIT inoculation message conditions received print crisis messages only.
Manipulation Check Variables
Threat. Since inoculation treatments should generate threat (Compton & Pfau,
2005), manipulated threat was assessed for the inoculation, supportive, and control
treatment groups (i.e., all participants) following their assigned treatment condition
during phase two. A measure consisting of five bipolar adjective pairs (i.e.,
nonthreatening/threatening, unintimidating/intimidating, not harmful/harmful,
safe/dangerous, not risky/risky) situated along a seven-point semantic differential scale
used in other inoculation studies (Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau et al., 1990; Pfau, 1992)
was employed. The threat scale used in this study has shown reliability in past
inoculation studies (Compton & Ivanov, 2012 [α = .96]; Pfau et al., 2005 [α = .96]; Pfau
et al., 2010 [α = .94]). Additionally, a recent confirmatory factor analysis conducted by
Compton and Ivanov (2012) demonstrated the measure’s validity. The level of reliability
in the current investigation was α = .81.
Counterarguing output. Consistent with McGuire’s (1961; 1962; 1964) original
research on inoculation theory, counterarguing is still considered a key mechanism of the
inoculation process (Compton & Pfau, 2005). Threat should motivate participants to
generate counterarguments, and refutational preemption should offer substance and
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practice for counterarguing during the process of generating resistance. For this reason,
counterarguing output was captured for participants exposed to an attack message at the
end of phase three.
Counterarguing was assessed using a check-off procedure employed in past
inoculation studies (see Banas & Bessarabova, 2009; Ivanov, Parker, & Dillingham,
2012). The check-off procedure consisted of asking participants to review 12 arguments
that reflected major arguments for and against staying in the market during a downturn.
Participants were asked to examine the list of 12 arguments and check off arguments they
thought of when considering whether or not to sell stock when the market is down.
Participants were also asked to rate the strength of each argument they checked off on a
one (weak) to seven (strong) scale.
Covariates
Involvement level. Previous findings (Pfau, 1992; 1997; Pfau et al., 2004) on
issue involvement indicate that the level of involvement a participant has with the topic
influences the level of resistance created by an inoculation treatment. By controlling for
this variable, it was possible to further isolate the impact of the experimental conditions.
Initial involvement level was captured at the end of phase one using an
abbreviated version of Zaichowsky’s (1985) Personal Involvement Inventory (PII) used
in other inoculation studies (Pfau et al., 2005). Eroglu and Machleit (1988) introduced
this version of the scale and since that time it shown reliability scores ranging from α =
.87 to α = 96 (see Ivanov et al., 2009a). The reliability level in the current study was α =
.97. The abbreviated version of the PII includes seven bi-polar adjective pairs:
unimportant/important, irrelevant/relevant, non-essential/essential, of no concern/of
concern to me, does not matter/matters to me, useless/useful, and trivial/fundamental.
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Risk propensity. A great deal of research (see Ho, 2009) indicates that a
person’s risk tolerance and coinciding propensity for risk taking or risk aversion play a
major role in the financial decisions he or she makes. Since this study concerns SIM
beliefs related to money invested in financial markets, propensity towards risk was
considered a covariate.
Risk aversion propensity was captured at the end of phase one using Hung and
Tangpong’s (2010) uni-dimensional General Risk Propensity Scale. This five item scale
consists of the following items: “I like to take chances, although I may fail”; “Although a
new thing has a high promise of reward, I do not want to be the first one who tries it”; “I
would rather wait until it has been tested and proven before I try it”; “When I have to
make a decision for which the consequence is not clear, I like to go with the safer option
although it may yield limited rewards”; “I like to try new things, knowing well that some
of them will disappoint me”; “To earn greater rewards, I am willing to take higher risks”.
The General Risk Propensity Scale has shown a reliability of α = .71 - .73. An
independent sample confirmatory factor analysis also confirmed the validity of the
General Risk Propensity Scale (Hung & Tangpong, 2010).
However, when insufficient reliability of the General Risk Propensity Scale
(Hung & Tangpong, 2010) was evident in this investigation an exploratory factor analysis
was performed. The requirement of sufficient sample size was met (e.g., 5-20 cases per
parameter estimate; or 1-14 ratio) as 398 cases divided by five parameter estimates is just
over 77 cases per estimate. Because Maximum Likelihood extraction requires the
measured variables to be normally distributed and without severe problems (i.e., |skew| >
2, kurtosis > 7), the distributions of all five items were examined and the absolute skew
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values ranged from .68 to -.18 and the kurtosis ranged from .19 to .99. The Varimax
method of rotation with Kaiser Normalization was used. Based on a 60/40 load test two
factors were present and three of the items loaded together. Those three scale items were
included in this investigation and the reliability after deletion of the other two items was
α = .78.
Prior investing experience. Participants’ level of prior investing experience
could impact the results of this investigation. Participants with a great deal of investing
experience may not interpret the financial crisis, inoculation, or supportive messages in
the same way as participants with little or no investing experience. Therefore, prior
investing experience was considered a covariate in this investigation.
To assess participants’ prior investing experience participants rated their own
level of investing experience at the end of phase one. Participants were presented with a
one-item seven point semantic differential scale ranging from “no experience” to “a lot of
experience”. The directions for this measure read, “Please rate your level of experience
with investing in the stock market.”
Dependent Variables and Measures
SIM beliefs. SIM beliefs constituted the main dependent variable of this study.
The level of SIM beliefs was assessed for all participants during phases one and three
using McCroskey and Richmond’s (1996) six-item Generalized Belief Measure. The
GBM has a high reported reliability (range: α = .94 - .97) and has been used consistently
to measure very specific beliefs (McCroskey, 2006). The level of reliability generated in
the current study was α = .98 in phase one and α = .99 in phase three. Contexts of the
GBM’s use include organizational, instructional, political, and interpersonal
communication (McCroskey, 2006). The GBM operates by stating the belief to be
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measured (e.g., “People should sell their stock when the market is down”) and then
offering five bipolar adjective pairs (I agree/I disagree, yes/no, false/true, right/wrong,
incorrect/correct) situated along a seven-point semantic differential response scale.
Belief certainty. In addition to the use of McCroskey and Richmond’s (1996)
GBM to ascertain belief presence, belief certainty was also measured using a 1-100 point
scale. Participants were asked to complete the scale by estimating how certain they were
about their belief toward the issue in question. Zero indicated ‘‘no certainty’’ and 100
indicated “absolute certainty” (Pfau et al., 2005).
During the analysis portion of this investigation index change scores were
calculated to measure changes in SIM beliefs and belief certainty. To control for the
initial phase one beliefs and certainty while capturing the inoculation-induced changes,
the final phase three beliefs and certainty were subtracted from the initial beliefs and
certainty captured in phase one. The resulting index change values for each group were
used as the dependent variables in this analysis. An index value of zero represents no
change while a positive change indicates strengthening and a negative change indicates
weakening of SIM beliefs and belief certainty.

Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Statistical Analyses
Multiple strategies were used to analyze the data in this study. For the sake of
parsimony, the hypotheses in this study were grouped into five sections and thus the data
analyses were conducted in five sections. Hence the results are presented in five parts
following the omnibus and preliminary analyses results. The first section of analyses
addressed hypotheses one and two, the second section addressed hypotheses three and
four, the third section addressed hypothesis five, the fourth section addressed hypotheses
six through nine, and the fifth section of analyses addressed hypothesis ten. The
dependent variables in each analysis were the level and certainty of the participant’s SIM
beliefs following the randomly assigned treatment and attack messages (or lack thereof
for the control and no crisis conditions). As explained in the methods section of this
study, the index change scores between phase one and three beliefs and belief certainty
were used to represent the dependent variables.
The first section of the analyses employed a Multivariate Analysis of Covariance
MANCOVA to determine if SIM belief or belief certainty differences existed among the
inoculation, supportive, and control conditions for participants exposed to a persuasive
attack. This omnibus test addressed hypotheses one and two.
The second analysis section was intended to discover differences among
inoculation, supportive, and control conditions for participants who were not exposed to a
crisis message. This analysis addressed hypotheses three and four. The participant’s
initial involvement level and his or her risk propensity were used as covariates in the
MANCOVAs for sections one and two to control for their influence on the dependent
variables. The multivariate tests were followed by univariate tests and – to further
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explore significant differences – planned comparisons using Dunn’s multiple comparison
procedure (see Kirk, 1995) were conducted on predicted outcomes.
The third section of analyses employed an independent samples t-test. The
purpose of the t-test was to determine whether or not inoculated participants’ SIM belief
levels were impacted differently when a crisis situation was presented through video
versus print.
Similar to the first and second sections, the fourth section of analyses employed
multivariate analysis followed by univariate tests and planned comparisons. Specifically,
prior to the univariate and planned comparison tests a 2 (inoculation/control) x 2 (PIT/no
PIT) MANCOVA was conducted. The purpose of this test was to determine whether or
not explicitly instructing participants regarding PIT would impact their SIM belief
protection more than traditional inoculation messages. The initial involvement level and
risk propensity of participants were considered once again as covariates.
Finally, the fifth section of the analyses employed an independent samples t-test.
The t-test was used to ascertain whether or not gain or loss frame inoculation messages
equally protected SIM beliefs when participants were exposed to a persuasive attack.
This report will first address the manipulation check results. The three
multivariate and corresponding univariate results for the significant variables will follow
the manipulation check results. A sequential presentation of the ten hypotheses and the
planned comparisons used to assess the hypotheses will conclude the results portion of
this investigation. However, prior to addressing the analyses it is relevant to note that
investing experience was omitted as a covariate due to the very low variation – namely a
lack of investing experience – reported by participants.
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Manipulation Checks
The first manipulation check in this study was assessed on the level of threat
generated by the treatment message in phase two. Threat is an integral component of the
inoculation process (see Compton & Pfau, 2005). Therefore individuals who received an
inoculation (M = 4.50, SD = 1.52, n = 231) message should have reported higher levels of
threat than those in the supportive (M = 3.95, SD = 1.50, n = 97) and control (M = 3.80,
SD = 1.67, n = 69) conditions. A univariate ANOVA including the inoculation,
supportive, and control conditions (i.e., the entire study population n = 513) indicated that
inoculation messages generated significantly more threat than the control (F(2, 394) =
11.02, p < .01, = .03) or supportive (F(2, 394) = 14.16, p < .01, = .03) treatment
messages. Based on the results of the threat manipulation check the remainder of the
analyses in this investigation were conducted.
The second manipulation check was performed to assess whether or not
inoculation treatments successfully generated higher counterarguing output than
supportive or control treatments following the phase three attack message. Participants
were provided a list of counterarguments and asked to designate which ones they had
previously considered regarding selling stock during a market downturn. Then
participants were then asked to rate the strength of the counterarguments they selected on
a one to seven scale. A multivariate analysis was conducted to see if participant number
or strength of counterarguments varied across treatment message conditions. Although
the multivariate test did not indicate a statistically significant difference (F(4, 586) =
1.59, p = .18) the means were in the anticipated direction for both, arguments checked off
(inoculation, M = 4.22, SD = 4.22, n = 199; supportive, M = 3.53, SD = 4.33, n = 58;
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control, M = 3.05, SD = 3.68, n = 39) and argument strength (inoculation, M = 4.90, SD =
2.23, n = 199; supportive, M = 4.24, SD = 2.67, n = 58; control, M = 4.83, SD = 2.14, n =
39). Since previous studies have shown that inoculation can function without first going
through the internal counterarguing mechanism (Mason, 2011) and relies primarily on
threat, the rest of the analyses this investigation were conducted as planned.
Multivariate and Univariate Results
The first omnibus test in this investigation was conducted to assess possible
differences among inoculation, supportive, and control groups in the crisis condition.
Initial involvement and risk aversion propensity were considered as covariates. The
results of the MANCOVA indicated that, while differences among the message groups
did exist (F(4, 582) = 3.84, p < .05, partial = .03), initial involvement (F(2, 290) =
1.74, p = .18) and risk (F(2, 290) = 2.18, p = .12) were not significant covariates.
Therefore the analysis was rerun as Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA)
without the covariates.
The MANOVA results indicated significant differences (F(4, 586) = 4.07, p < .05,
partial = .03) among the three treatment groups. The univariate tests that followed
showed significant effects of the message condition on belief level (F(2, 293) = 7.80, p <
.01, partial = .05) and the results approached significance for belief certainty (F(2,
293) = 2.94, p = .054).
A second multivariate analysis was conducted to detect differences among
participants in the inoculation, supportive, and control groups who were not exposed to a
persuasive attack in the form of a crisis situation. Initial involvement and risk aversion
propensity were considered as covariates. The results of the MANCOVA indicated that
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no significant differences existed among treatment groups (F(4, 194) = 1.58, p = .18). In
addition, initial involvement (F(2, 96) =.85, p = .43) and risk aversion propensity (F(2,
96) = 1.20, p = .31) were not significant covariates.
Due to the statistical insignificance of the covariates in the MANCOVA the
analysis was rerun without the covariates. Once again no significant differences were
detected among the inoculation, supportive, and control message groups (F(4, 198) =
1.70, p = .16). Hence, univariate tests were not conducted.
The third and final multivaraite analysis in this investigation was a 2
(inoculation/control) x 2 (PIT/no PIT) MANCOVA. Initial involvement and risk
aversion propensity were once again considered as covariates. The results indicated that
significant differences existed among the message groups (F(6, 310) = 3.45, p < .01,
partial = .06). However, initial involvement (F(2, 154) = .75, p = .48) and risk
aversion propensity (F(2, 154) = 1.01, p = .34) were once again not significant as
covariates.
Due to the statistical insignificance of the covariates in the 2 (inoculation/control)
x 2 (PIT/no PIT) MANCOVA, the analysis was rerun as MANOVA. The results again
indicated a significant difference among the message groups (F(6, 314) = 3.65, p < .01,
partial = .07). The univariate tests that followed the MANOVA indicated that the
treatment message (or lack thereof in the case of the control group) had a significant
impact on belief level (F(3, 157) = 4.67, p < .01, = .08) and belief certainty (F(3, 157)
= 3.41, p < .05, = .06).
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Hypotheses
Hypotheses addressing message effects in crisis. Hypotheses one and two dealt
with the ability of inoculation messages to protect SIM beliefs better than supportive and
control messages when the attack message indicated crisis. The MANOVA results for
hypotheses one and two indicated significant differences (F(4, 586) = 4.07, p < .05,
partial = .03) among the three treatment groups. The univariate tests that followed
showed significant effects of the message condition on belief level (F(2, 293) = 7.80, p <
.01, partial = .05) and the results approached significance for belief certainty (F(2,
293) = 2.94, p = .054). Planned comparisons were conducted to compare individual
means and thus fully assess the hypotheses. Therefore, Dunn’s planned comparisons (see
Kirk, 1995) were used to assess both belief and belief certainty levels of participants.
Hypothesis one addressed the ability of inoculation messages to protect beliefs
better than control messages when participants were exposed to an attack message
indicating crisis. Specifically, hypothesis one predicted that participants would report
higher SIM beliefs (H1a) and greater certainty in SIM beliefs (H1b) when exposed to an
inoculation message than when exposed to a control message. Planned comparisons
provided support for both parts (a and b) of this hypothesis. Participants exposed to an
inoculation message reported both higher levels of belief (H1a) (F(1, 236) = 13.5, p <
.01, = .04) and belief certainty (H1b) (F(1, 236) = 4.84, p < .05, = .02) than those in
the control group (see Table 4.1).
Hypothesis two dealt with the ability of inoculation messages to protect beliefs
better than supportive messages when participants were exposed to an attack message
indicating crisis. Hypothesis two predicted that participants would report higher SIM
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beliefs and greater certainty in SIM beliefs when exposed to an inoculation message than
when exposed to a supportive message. Planned comparisons provided partial support
for this hypothesis. Inoculation messages protected beliefs (H2a) better than supportive
messages (F(1, 255) = 4.52, p < .05, = .01) but certainty (H2b) in those beliefs was not
significantly different between participants who received the inoculation and supportive
messages (F(1, 255) = 2.04, p = .15) (see Table 4.1).
Hypotheses addressing message effects in absence of a crisis. Hypotheses
three and four were designed to explore the potential effects of inoculation and
supportive messages in absence of a crisis. A no message control group was also a part
of the analysis. Namely, hypotheses three and four predicted that, in absence of an attack
indicating crisis, the beliefs and certainty of participants exposed to an inoculation
message would not vary significantly from participants in the control and supportive
groups. Stated simply, hypotheses three and four predicted that inoculation messages
would not harm the SIM belief levels of participants if a crisis did not occur and thus null
hypotheses were advanced.
Since this section of analysis proposed null hypotheses a test of statistical power
was conducted. The purpose of the power test was to ascertain whether or not the sample
size was sufficient to detect differences among groups. An estimated effect size of r =
.20 was used since this is the average effect size in inoculation studies as established by
recent meta-analysis (Banas & Rains, 2010). Combined with the commonly accepted
measurement standards for power analysis (α = .95, 1 – β = .80; Cohen, 1990) it was
ascertained that a sample size of 153 participants should generate an acceptable level of
power (see Ivanov et al., 2009a). Given that the sample size exceeded this estimate the
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analysis of hypotheses three and four proceeded. Multivariate test results supported null
hypotheses three and four (F(4, 198) = 1.70, p = .16).
Hypothesis addressing the effect of crisis modality. Hypothesis five concerned
whether inoculation messages could protect beliefs equally well when participants were
exposed to a print and video crisis message. Namely, hypothesis five predicted that
participants who had been exposed to an inoculation message would report lower SIM
beliefs (H5a) and lower certainty in those beliefs (H5b) when exposed to a crisis message
through video than when exposed to a crisis message through print. An independent
samples t-test did not provide support for either part of this hypothesis. Participants
exposed to a video crisis (M = -.84, SD = 1.52, n = 34) did not report lower belief levels
(t(197) = -.82, p = .41) than participants exposed to a print crisis (M = -.64, SD = 1. 25, n
= 165). Similarly, belief certainty (t(197) = -.26, p = .74) did not vary significantly
between participants in the video (M = .94, SD = 40.21, n = 34) and print (M = -1.26, SD
= 41.20, n = 165) conditions.
Hypotheses addressing the impact of PIT instructions. Hypotheses six
through nine dealt with the impact of explicit PIT instructions on the inoculation process.
The 2 (inoculation/control) x 2 (PIT/no PIT) MANOVA indicated significant differences
(F(6, 314) = 3.65, p < .01, partial = .07) on at least one of the dependent variables.
Univariate tests were used to further explore omnibus test results and showed that the
treatment message (or lack thereof in the case of the control group) had a significant
impact on belief level (F(3, 157) = 4.67, p < .01, = .08) and belief certainty (F(3, 157)
= 3.41, p < .05, = .06). Dunn’s planned comparisons were used to assess both belief
levels (H6a, H7a, H8a, and H9a) and belief certainty levels (H6b, H7b, H8b, and H9b).
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Hypothesis six predicted that participants exposed to an inoculation message
asking them to not engage in PIT would report higher SIM beliefs (H6a) and greater
certainty in those beliefs (H6b) than participants in the control condition. Planned
comparisons provided partial support for this hypothesis. Compared to the control
condition, participants in the no PIT group reported higher levels of SIM beliefs (F(1, 78)
= 10.25, p < .01, = .06) but not greater certainty in those beliefs (F(1, 78) = .13, p =
.72) (see Table 4.2).
Hypothesis seven predicted that participants exposed to an inoculation message
asking them to not engage in PIT would report lower SIM beliefs (H7a) and lower
certainty in those beliefs (H7b) than participants exposed to an inoculation message
without mention of PIT. Planned comparisons did not provide support for this
hypothesis. No significant differences in beliefs (F(1, 74) = .84, p = .36) or certainty
(F(1, 74) = .39, p = .53) were found (see Table 4.2).
Hypothesis eight addressed the effectiveness of an inoculation message asking
participants to engage in PIT versus an inoculation message without mention of PIT.
Specifically, hypothesis eight predicted that participants exposed to an inoculation
message asking them to engage in PIT would report higher levels of SIM beliefs (H8a)
and higher certainty in those beliefs (H8b) than participants exposed to an inoculation
message without mention of PIT. Planned comparisons did not provide support for this
hypothesis. No significant differences in beliefs (F(1, 81) = .91, p = .34) were found,
however statistical difference was approached in belief certainty (F(1, 81) = 3.20, p =
.08) (see Table 4.2).
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Hypothesis nine predicted that participants who were exposed to an inoculation
message asking that they engage in PIT would report greater levels of SIM beliefs (H9a)
and greater certainty in those beliefs (H9b) than participants who were exposed to an
inoculation message asking that they not engage in PIT. Planned comparisons provided
partial support for this hypothesis. Participants in the PIT condition did not report higher
belief levels (F(1, 86) = .00, p = 1.00) but did report greater certainty in their beliefs (F(1,
86) = 6.39, p < .05, = .04) than those participants in the no PIT condition (see Table
4.2).
Hypothesis addressing gain and loss frame inoculation messages. Hypothesis
ten dealt with inoculation messages that employed a gain frame versus those that
employed a loss frame. Specifically, hypothesis ten predicted that participants exposed to
a loss frame inoculation message would report higher levels of SIM beliefs (H10a) and
higher certainty in those beliefs (H10b) than participants exposed to a gain frame
inoculation message. An independent samples t-test provided partial support for
hypothesis ten. Participants in the loss frame condition (M = -.54, SD = 1.22, n = 157)
reported higher SIM beliefs (t (53.09) = 2.79, p < .01, = .13) than those in the gain
frame condition (M = -1.26, SD = 1.50, n = 40). While the results were in the anticipated
direction (loss frame M = .77, SD = 41.55, n = 157; gain frame M = -7.83, SD = 38.26, n
= 40), the scores for belief certainty fell short of statistical significance (t (195) = 1.19, p
= .12).
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Table 4.1
Message effects in crisis and no crisis (Hypotheses 1-4)

Dependent Variable

M
(SD)
________________________________
Belief
Certainty
_______________ ___________________
Inoculation
Crisis
n = 199

-.68ab
(1.30)

-.88c
(40.94)

No Crisis
n = 32

-.61
(1.57)

2.22
(18.84)

Crisis
n = 58

-1.15a
(1.91)

-10.00
(51.33)

No Crisis
n = 39

-.44
(1.26)

-8.08
(27.13)

Crisis
n = 39

-1.64b
(1.75)

-17.36c
(37.67)

No Crisis
n = 31

-.84
(1.39)

8.26
(45.91)

Supportive

Control

Note. Beliefs were measured at the end of Phase 1 and Phase 3 using a seven point scale.
Certainty was measured with a 1-100 rating. Index changes scores between phases one
and three were calculated for beliefs and certainty, with zero representing no change, a
positive change representing belief strengthening, and a negative change representing
belief weakening.
ab
c

Indicate significantly different groups within variable and market scenario at p < .01.
Indicates significantly different groups within variable and market scenario at p < .05.
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Table 4.2
Impact of explicit PIT instructions (Hypotheses 6-9)
Dependent Variable M
(SD)
_______________________________
Belief
__________

Certainty
__________

Inoculation (standard)
n = 35

-.90
(1.48)

-8.37
(36.34)

Inoculation (PIT)
n = 47

-.59
(1.13)

7.45b
(41.95)

Inoculation (no PIT)
n = 40

-.59a
(1.46)

-14.10b
(41.37)

-1.64a
(1.75)

-17.36
(37.67)

Control
n = 39

Note. Beliefs were measured at the end of Phase 1 and Phase 3 using a seven point scale.
Certainty was measured with a 1-100 rating. Index changes scores between phases one
and three were calculated for beliefs and certainty, with zero representing no change, a
positive change representing belief strengthening, and a negative change representing
belief weakening.
a

Indicates significantly different groups within variable at p < .01.
Indicates significantly different groups within variable at p < .05.

b
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Discussion
The primary purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not
inoculation messages are a viable communication strategy to preemptively protect SIM
beliefs during forthcoming financial crises. Ancillary purposes of this study were to
further investigate the role of print and video crises, explicit instructions regarding PIT,
and gain and loss frame inoculation messages on the inoculation process. Hence, this
section will begin with a discussion of the practical implications of the findings and will
be followed by a review of the study’s limitations. Next, suggestions for future research
will be provided and these will address theoretical questions raised by this investigation.
This study will end with brief concluding remarks.
The primary purpose of this study was of a practical nature. A commonly
occurring phenomenon in the investing world is collapsed SIM beliefs amidst financial
crisis. In review, collapsed SIM beliefs are unplanned securities sales in reaction to
unfavorable new or events. Given the perpetual ups and downs of securities markets,
collapsed SIM beliefs can be a frequent and persistent occurrence. While the knee-jerk
sale of securities might ease investor anxiety in the short term, the long-term
consequences of not adhering to a sound investment plan can be devastating. Not only
can widespread securities sales worsen an existing financial crisis by deepening losses for
financial institutions and the market as a whole, but in the age when people are expected
to save and plan for their own retirement portfolio losses can have very real and harmful
consequences for the general investing public. Furthermore, since financial institutions
aiming to protect SIM beliefs never know when a crisis will occur – only that one
inevitably will (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Rotheli, 2007) – a preemptive crisis
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communication strategy is a paramount concern.
Therefore, the findings related to hypotheses one through four in this study are
extremely encouraging. The results of this investigation clearly support inoculation’s
viability as a preemptive crisis communication strategy. Similar to other studies that
have addressed inoculation in the crisis communication context (Wan & Pfau, 2004;
Wigley & Pfau, 2010), the results of this investigation demonstrate that inoculation
messages prevent belief slippage better than controls when participants are faced with an
attack in the form of a crisis situation. However, unlike previous inoculation studies in
the crisis communication context that predicted but did not find a significant difference
between inoculation and supportive conditions, this study indicates that inoculation is a
superior belief protection strategy compared to supportive-only messages. The strength
of an inoculation strategy as opposed to a supportive-only strategy is more in line with
the vast amount of inoculation research outside of the crisis communication context (see
Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005).
As researchers have illustrated (Compton & Pfau, 2005), even though research
results have been largely positive for inoculation theory a practitioner hesitation has been
a preference for a supportive strategy. And certainly use of a supportive strategy is better
than not communicating at all. Research results in this study and numerous others (see
Banas & Rains, 2010; Compton & Pfau, 2005) have shown less belief change for
supportive messages as opposed to control or no message groups. These effects have
persisted across no crisis and crisis contexts. Thus, when faced with the option of not
communicating at all, a supportive strategy is advocated.
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However, an argument from the scholarly community – namely those who study
inoculation – has been that the time and effort put into communication campaigns could
be more beneficial if a more effective message strategy was used. Consistent research
findings spanning five decades have pointed to the superiority of inoculation messages as
opposed to supportive ones in contexts such as corporate advertising and public relations
(Burgoon, Pfau, & Birk, 1995; Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau, 1992; Pfau, Haigh, Sims, &
Wigley, 2007; Pfau & Wan, 2006), political campaigns (An & Pfau, 2004; Compton &
Ivanov, 2013; Pfau & Burgoon, 1988; Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, & Sorenson, 1990), adolescent
health campaigns (Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Pfau, Van Bockern, & Kang, 1992; Pfau &
Van Bockern, 1994), differences in cultural message processing (Ivanov, Parker, Miller,
& Pfau, 2012), interpersonal communication (Sutton, 2011), and instructional/educational
communication (Compton & Pfau, 2008).
This study extends that well-founded argument – that using an inoculation-based
message strategy is better than using a supportive one – into the realm of crisis
communication. While previous inoculation work has shown that a company should
choose inoculation over not communicating in crisis (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau,
2010), results of this study beg for consideration of an inoculation strategy to replace an
existing or planned supportive one. This investigation adds strength to the argument that
an inoculation strategy is more effective, particularly since this study replicated
inoculation-superior findings into a new context.
In addition, an inoculation strategy might be particularly appealing to
practitioners in the crisis communication context. A major concern for practitioners
considering an inoculation strategy has been pointing out weaknesses of an organization
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or industry unnecessarily (Compton & Pfau, 2005). Therefore, in an applied setting
practitioners have shown an increased comfort level with a supportive, or bolstering,
strategy (Compton & Pfau, 2005). However, when used in a crisis context practitioners
could view an inoculation strategy as simply a more controlled way of managing
stakeholder perception of weaknesses. Since crises are inevitable (Mitroff & Pearson,
1993), especially in the investing arena (Rotheli, 2007), practitioners would do well to
realize that at some point their organization’s or industry’s flaws will be addressed by an
external party. Would it be better for stakeholders to have been exposed to potential
weaknesses in a structured way via an inoculation message or to face crisis and the
corresponding reputational damage (see Benoit, 1997) with no prior warning? Stated
simply, would practitioners rather address their weaknesses preemptively or have
someone else do it for them? The research findings concerning inoculation demonstrate
the advantage for using an inoculation strategy prior to persuasive attack, which can now
also be understood as a crisis situation.
Furthermore, this study extends previous inoculation and crisis communication
work (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010) by extending the possible scope of
inoculation’s impact. While other studies concerning inoculation and crisis
communication have focused on messages related to a specific company (Wan & Pfau,
2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010), this study found support for inoculation messages when the
content of the treatment and attack messages related to an industry-wide crisis.
Inoculation messages protected SIM beliefs when faced with an attack message that
indicated widespread stock market sell-offs as opposed to trouble or crisis at a specific
financial institution. This finding greatly boosts inoculation’s value as a preemptive
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crisis communication strategy. If, as previously mentioned, a practitioner concern is
unnecessarily pointing out organizational weaknesses, the strategy could still be effective
if the inoculation message focused on the industry as a whole rather than the
organization. Furthermore, since the details of a crisis are not known in advance, the
ability to focus the preemptive message on the industry as a whole might further ensure
practitioners that the protection would extend into future unknown crises.
Another key question posed in this study was whether or not inoculation messages
could actually harm beliefs in the absence of a crisis. As demonstrated by the support for
hypotheses three and four, inoculation messages did not harm beliefs in absence of a
crisis when compared with supportive and control messages. This finding should further
ease practitioner hesitation about using an inoculation as compared to a supportive
message strategy. An obvious question for practitioners would be that since inoculation
involves going outside of an organization’s comfort zone to address forthcoming
concerns what happens if a crisis never comes? In other words, what is the risk to
stakeholder perceptions that would otherwise be untouched? The findings regarding
hypotheses three and four address this valid concern. Practitioners should feel assured
that not only do inoculation messages prepare for an impending crisis, but that the
potential risk of harming stakeholder beliefs in absence of a crisis is mitigated.
The collective results for hypotheses one through four provide intriguing
possibilities for communication practitioners. The results related to hypotheses one
through four clearly indicate that, yes, inoculation messages can provide a viable message
strategy for the protection of SIM beliefs. This finding provides a valuable asset for
financial institutions and special interest organizations looking to stabilize the financial
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health of investors and the market as a whole. This finding also provides support for
recent suggestions (Kim, 2013) that inoculation can be used as a preemptive crisis
communication strategy in the organizational communication context. Furthermore,
three of the four barriers to inoculation’s practical use reviewed earlier in this study – the
preference for no communication, the preference for a bolstering strategy, and concerns
about the impact of inoculation message in absence of a crisis – are addressed with the
results of hypotheses one through four. Inoculation messages performed better than the
no message control group and supportive messages and did not harm beliefs in absence of
a crisis.
The fourth barrier to inoculation’s use – concerns about the impact of the crisis
communication medium – was addressed by the hypothesis five results. As discussed
earlier in this study, inoculation research until this point has almost solely tested the
effectiveness of inoculation messages by using a print attack message (see Banas &
Rains, 2010). Therefore, to meet this study’s primary goal of investigating the applied
value of inoculation messages to protect SIM beliefs an imperative question was whether
or not multimodal attack messages, which actual investors are certain to face, could derail
the belief protection created by inoculation messages.
The medium-theory (see Meyrowitz 1985; 1994) based hypothesis five actually
predicted that the concern about crisis communication medium was legitimate and that
for inoculated participants video crisis messages would lessen SIM beliefs more than
print crisis messages. While the lack of support for hypothesis five raises questions about
medium theory, the results are extremely positive for the overall implications of this
study. Since video and print crisis messages did not significantly impact inoculation’s
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ability to protect beliefs the fourth barrier to inoculation’s use a crisis communication
strategy is addressed. Based on the results of this study organizations should feel
confident that inoculating their stakeholders is even more worthwhile since the belief
protection created may be able to withstand attacks presented through multimodal (e.g.,
video) in addition to print formats. Combined with past novel counterargument findings
(Pfau 1992; Wan & Pfau, 2004), and multiple attack findings (Ivanov et al., 2009a) the
support for protection against multimodal attack formats broadens the scope of
inoculation’s applied potential. Furthermore, the vast amount of inoculation research that
employs an attack in print form is more applicable to the crisis communication context.
Along those lines, and not wholly related to this work, this finding boosts the validity of
inoculation research as a whole since the communication environment is becoming
increasingly multimodal (Quandt & von Pape, 2010).
As previously mentioned, another ancillary purpose of this investigation was to
further explore the role of explicit PIT instructions on the inoculation process.
Hypotheses six through nine addressed this purpose. Until recently (Ivanov et al., 2012;
Ivanov, Miller, et al., 2012) inoculation was thought to be an entirely internal subvocal
process (see Compton & Pfau, 2005). However, recent research by Ivanov and colleagues
had indicated that talk following the inoculation process might strengthen resistance.
While this finding was intriguing, further support for the impact of PIT threatened the
validity of decades of inoculation work that assumed internal processing of the
inoculation message (Ivanov, Miller, et al., 2012). Therefore this investigation responded
to Ivanov and colleagues’ call to further explore the PIT and inoculation relationship.
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The findings of this study indicate that, in line with the original underpinnings of
inoculation theory (McGuire 1962; 1964), the strengthening (or lack of erosion) of beliefs
is primarily an internal process. Both PIT and no PIT inoculation messages generated
belief protection equally well. As expected, all of the inoculation conditions (standard,
PIT, and no PIT) showed more belief protection than the no message control group. As
such the findings of this study suggest that the inoculation message is primarily
responsible for creating belief protection and explicit PIT instructions might not impact
the formation of belief protection as much as recently suggested (Ivanov, Miller, et al.,
2012).
While PIT did not impact belief levels in this investigation, the results indicate
that PIT can impact belief certainty. Compared to the no PIT condition, the PIT group
participants reported more certainty in their SIM beliefs, thus supporting hypothesis H9b.
This finding indicates that though talking about the content of the inoculation treatment
might not establish belief protection, PIT can still serve a valuable function in the
inoculation process. In addition, even though the results were not statistically significant,
the trend of other results concerning PIT and certainty points to a positive relationship.
When participants were instructed to talk about the issue (PIT) they reported more
certainty in their beliefs than those who received a standard inoculation message with
instruction to refrain from PIT (no PIT). The findings regarding PIT and belief certainty
in this investigation point to an agreement with Ivanov and colleagues’ (2012) suggestion
that PIT functions as reassurance and advocacy for inoculated individuals’ positions.
The theoretical implications and future research directions based on the PIT
findings in this study will be discussed later in this investigation. Here it should be noted
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that the PIT findings also further the practical utility of inoculation theory, which is a
primary goal of this study. In contrast to the Ivanov et al. (2012) study the findings here
seem to delineate between the function of the inoculation message itself – to create the
protection – and the enhancement potential of PIT instructions to strengthen the created
protection. This study raises a new possibility regarding past PIT research, however.
Ivanov and colleagues (2012) did not separately measure attitudes and attitudinal
certainty. Therefore, some of the enhanced attitude protection they found as a result of
PIT could have actually been an increase in certainty.
This separation of the inoculation message and PIT functions can especially aid
practitioners in contexts where interpersonal discussion is likely and/or possible. If
practitioners know that the inoculated individuals will have a chance to discuss their
views then presumably an explicit PIT instruction can be used to strengthen generated
belief protection. An example from past research is in the form of adolescent health
campaigns (Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Parker et al., 2012; Pfau et al., 1992; Pfau & Van
Bockern, 1994). In this context inoculation messages have typically been directed at
school age students, who have almost daily contact with each other in the school setting.
Therefore encouraging PIT in an inoculation message geared towards this group could
increase belief certainty and therefore belief protection.
The final ancillary goal of this study was to join the well-established Prospect
Theory (PT) with inoculation research. The context of investing – and the corresponding
typical use of gain and loss language – presented a prime opportunity to introduce PT
into inoculation research. Results of this study revealed, by providing partial support for
hypothesis ten, that using a loss frame inoculation message did indeed increase belief
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level when compared with the participants who received a gain frame inoculation
message. While the results were not statistically significant, cautious support can also be
given to the ability of a loss-framed inoculation message to also increase belief certainty.
The support for PT in this study is valuable for practitioners seeking to use an
inoculation-based strategy to protect SIM beliefs. As noted earlier in this study, an
attractive aspect for inoculation’s applied use is the exact, theoretically supported
message design offered by decades of inoculation research. The ability to boost
inoculation’s potency by integrating PT offers even more nuanced guidance to
practitioners seeking to protect SIM beliefs with inoculation messages. Furthering
inoculation’s applied value complements the primary goal of this investigation.
Practitioners in the financial context can use this investigation as evidence that “losses
loom larger than gains” (Rick, 2010, p. 454) when trying to mitigate the ramifications of
unplanned securities sales with preemptive crisis messages.
Limitations
While this study has provided many avenues for practice (previously addressed)
and theory (addressed in the proceeding section), some limitations should be noted. The
main limitation of this study concerns the study population. As previously mentioned,
the use of university students as a convenience sample could be considered a limitation as
the implications of the results for actual investors could be questionable. Without
knowledge of the terminology or fundamental principles of investing participants could
have been overwhelmed and thus not participated to the best of their ability. However,
this study posits that the lack of investing experience assumed and reported by the study
population actually boosts the validity of the study. Without incurring actual stock
market losses the student population can be viewed as a more objective pool of
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participants. Nonetheless, the results of this study should be replicated with actual stock
market investors to enhance the validity.
However, if the use of students threatens the validity of the results and
necessitates the use of actual investors then a derivative limitation is the inability to
isolate the actual experiences of investors. Affect tied to stock market gains and losses,
investing confidence, or investing knowledge level could interfere with study responses.
The inherent complications in establishing a suitable study population can presumably be
addressed by replicating study results across both inexperienced (possibly student) and
experienced investing populations.
An additional limitation in this study was the failure of the counterarguing
manipulation in phase three. Though research (Mason, 2011) has indicated that
inoculation can bypass the counterarguing mechanism and function solely on elicited
threat, counterarguing is still considered an important part of the inoculation process
(Compton, 2013). As such an inoculation message should generate counterarguing in
support of the person’s beliefs and against the persuasive attack. Part of the reason the
messages in this study did not produce sufficient counterarguing might have been that
subjects did not have a firm grasp on the investing terminology inherent in this context of
study.
While the scales and items in phases one and two of the study (see Appendix A),
including the successful threat manipulation check, included very general statements
(e.g., “People should sell their stock when the market is down” [belief] and “I find the
possibility of being persuaded to sell stock during a down market to be” [threat]), the
counterarguing measure was more specific. The 12 statements that participants were
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asked to review were more technical in nature despite an effort to simplify them (e.g.,
“Investments should be held during a market downturn to benefit from future upswings”;
“Investors should not have to worry that they are losing money, so they should sell their
securities when the value goes down”; “Investors should purchase investments with the
attitude that holdings should be sold if a bad market makes them nervous”) (see
Appendix A). The directions of the counterarguing measure asked participants to “Check
off ONLY arguments that you thought of about the issue of selling stock when the market
is down.” Therefore, if participants did not internally phrase their counterarguments
using the terminology provided in the measure, but rather just had a general concept of
not selling stocks in down markets, they might have chosen to not check off a
counterargument they actually considered. Given the complications of capturing
counterarguing in this study future studies in the investing context should simplify the
language in the counterarguing measure, in addition to allowing participants to also use a
thought-listing measure (Banas & Bessarabova, 2009; Ivanov, Parker, & Dillingham,
2012).
The statistical insignificance of the initial involvement covariate in this study was
also perplexing and possibly a limitation. Repeated studies (see Banas & Rains, 2010;
Pfau et al., 1997; 2003; 2004; 2005) have shown that involvement plays a role in the
strength of a person’s conferred resistance. Namely, moderate involvement levels (Banas
& Rains, 2010) are most conducive for generating resistance as opposed to high and low
involvement levels. Since, as seen in three MANCOVA analyses, involvement did not
vary participants’ generated resistance the results suggest that possibly the issue was not
involving enough for the study population. This suspicion is somewhat confirmed by the
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lack of investing experience reported by participants. Since the issue was not wholly
relevant to participants the results might have been weaker than they would have been
with either a different population or a different and more involving crisis.
Finally, a contextual limitation should be noted. Inoculation showed success in
the context of protecting SIM beliefs amidst an industry-wide financial crisis. The
context of investing lent itself well to testing inoculation in the crisis communication
context since threat was easily elicited due to inherent gain and loss language. Therefore,
the findings in this study could be issue specific. As such future studies should explore
whether or not industry-wide crisis messages are effective outside the investing context.
Suggestions for future research in that area are discussed in more detail in the following
section.
Future Studies
This investigation prompts exciting future research. The discussion of future
studies is grouped categorically in the proceeding paragraphs.
Inoculation and crises. This study indicates that the belief protection created by
inoculation messages applies when the attack message indicates a crisis situation.
However, future research needs to further nuance inoculation’s role as a crisis
communication strategy. To date only two other studies (Wan & Pfau, 2004; Wigley &
Pfau, 2010) besides this investigation explore inoculation in the crisis communication
context. The results of this study differ from the other two crisis studies in two ways:
first, in contrast to Wan and Pfau (2004) and Wigley and Pfau (2010), inoculation
messages performed better than supportive messages, and, second, the protection created
by inoculation messages extended beyond a company-specific attack.
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To continue the study of inoculation and crisis future studies need to attempt to
replicate the inoculation-superior findings. Even though the results of this study align
with the majority of inoculation studies that have found inoculation messages to protect
beliefs better than supportive-only messages (see Compton & Pfau, 2005), these findings
are in the minority among other inoculation-based crisis communication studies (Wan &
Pfau, 2004; Wigley & Pfau, 2010). Therefore, further work is needed to confirm the
finding in that inoculation messages can protect belief slippage better than supportive
messages in a crisis situation.
In addition, while this study demonstrates inoculation’s value in the financial
context, further work needs to explore inoculation’s potential in other industries and
crisis types. Specifically, even though inoculation messages protected against a noncompany specific message in this study will that protection apply in a different context?
Furthermore, even though research has previously established that inoculation can
protect against novel counterarguments (Pfau, 1992; Wan & Pfau, 2004), how far does
this protection extend in crisis situations? For example, can inoculation messages about
the financial industry protect financial attitudes that might decline as a result of political
or social uncertainty? Previous work (Parker et al., 2012) suggests that cross-protection
can occur in the interpersonal communication context, but to what extent does that crossprotection translate in the crisis communication context and on a larger scale? Can
inoculation messages about preparedness in general protect against panic following, for
example, a natural disaster? In the organizational communication context, can
inoculation messages embedded in corporate advertising as Kim (2013) suggests protect
beliefs about an industry as a whole? These questions are important for the use of
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inoculation messages in crisis communication but are not answered by the current
investigation.
Modality of treatment and attack messages. The findings of this study
regarding multimodal communication formats advance inoculation theory as a whole.
The finding that inoculation messages can protect beliefs equally well against attacks
presented through video and through print boosts the practical utility of the theory.
However, the unsupported hypothesis five is also beneficial for inoculation scholarship.
Since inoculation research has almost exclusively used print treatment and attack
messages (see Banas & Rains, 2010) and treated modality as a “neutral conduit of
message content” (Pfau, 1990, p. 195), a significant difference between print and video
messages would have challenged the validity of foundational studies.
The current finding – that there is no significant difference between print and
video crisis messages’ ability to threaten inoculated individuals’ beliefs – aligns with the
Pfau et al. (2000) study that found no difference between print and video inoculation
messages. Taken together these two studies, the only two to explicitly address modality,
suggest that indeed communication modality does not significantly impact the inoculation
process. While this finding is challenging to the hypotheses advanced in this study it
further validates past research using print inoculation and attack messages.
As mentioned the preceding paragraph, this study is only the second to purposely
investigate communication modality and the first to hypothesize about a video attack
message. Therefore, in some ways it is encouraging that this study aligns with the
findings of Pfau and colleagues (2000) that surmise little to no differences exist among
communication modalities. However, some nagging questions about communication
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modality and inoculation exist that are not answered by this research.
First, as addressed earlier in this study, three extant inoculation studies (An &
Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003) have used print and video messages
interchangeably and found equivocal results with regard to conferring resistance to
persuasion. This seems to be more than chance, since Godbold and Pfau (2000) could
not protect against video attacks with video inoculation messages, Nabi (2003) found that
resistance created via a traditional “talking head” news format did not protect well
against a video attack, and An and Pfau (2004) did not have success protecting against
video attacks with print inoculation messages.
The cofounding results in these studies are what would be expected when viewed
through the lens of a great deal of mass media research (see Biocca, 2008; McQuail,
2010). The claim that print and video mediums are equivalent is in direct opposition to
most mass media theorizing. Whether mass media scholars argue that video is a more
engaging format (e.g., Meyrowitz, 1985; 1994; Wiegman, 1989) or print is a more
engaging format (e.g., Krugman, 1965; McQuail, 2010), both groups agree that media
formats vary in their impact. Could it be that print is more engaging in some cases due to
the attention required for reading while in other cases the multi-sensory experience of
video would more thoroughly capture interest? What about video messages that have
print elements, such as a news program with a ticker display on the bottom of the screen?
An alternate explanation for the confounding modality results in this and other
inoculation studies (i.e., An & Pfau, 2004; Godbold & Pfau, 2000; Nabi, 2003) could be
that some feature of the inoculation process or aspect of inoculation research
differentiates modality in inoculation from modality in other theoretical processes. Do
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the varying contexts of inoculation research explain the theoretical stalemate between
print and video messages? Or does some feature of the inoculation truly make it a rare
case exception of a-modality – a protected space in which modality truly does not matter?
If inoculation is indeed an exception to the modality differences discussed in other areas
of communication scholarship (see McQuail, 2010) then further research is needed to
ascertain exactly what levels the playing field among modalities. Further research is
especially important since studies have tested print inoculation messages with a print
attack (see Compton & Pfau, 2005), video inoculation treatments with a print attack (Pfau
et al., 2000) and a print inoculation message with a video attack (current study) but has
yet to explicitly explore the impact of a video attack on a video inoculation message.
Finally, the results of this investigation could point to a more complex issue than
the two explanations covered earlier in this section. What if rather than uniform or
situational strengths, video and print simply engage participants differently and thus
cannot be conclusively compared? Namely, what if the engaging aspects of video
processing (Meyrowitz, 1985; 1994) and the engaging aspects of print processing
(Biocca, 2008; McQuail, 2010) void the other’s strengths? As mentioned earlier in this
investigation, Mazzoco and colleagues (2000; 2006) argue that the cognitive resources
required to consume multiple media forms (e.g., video) leave less cognitive resources
available to engage in other mental processes, which some scholars (Ivanov et al., 2009a)
note could include processing of inoculation messages. On the other hand, print
messages are much harder to actively process since reading is required (see Biocca, 2008;
McQuail, 2010). Can a person really reach the necessary level of threat activation and
produce relevant counterarguments in response to an inoculation message while he or she
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is reading? Needless to say, further research surrounding modality and the inoculation
process is needed based on the results of this and other investigations.
Hypotheses addressing the impact of PIT. Several of the hypotheses in this
study were designed to explore the impact of explicit PIT instructions on the inoculation
process. Given the burgeoning nature of PIT study this section will compare several
aspects of this work with the Ivanov, Miller, and colleagues (2012) findings and use the
comparison to raise PIT-related questions prompted by this work.
Both this study and the Ivanov, Miller et al. (2012) study found that messages
containing explicit PIT instructions generated resistance. However, the results regarding
the change in outcome variables differ between studies. Ivanov and colleagues found that
explicit PIT instructions increased resistance to attitude change, suggesting a vocal
component to what was previously considered a subvocal process (Compton & Pfau,
2005). Meanwhile, this study focused on belief change as the primary dependent variable
and did not see an increase in protection with explicit instructions to engage in PIT.
Therefore results of this study support the longstanding proposition that creation of belief
protection is a subvocal process.
The differences in these findings could be attributed to the isolation of vocal and
subvocal processes achieved in this study through instructions to engage and not to
engage in PIT. The observed resistance in the Ivanov and colleagues (2012) study could
have actually been occurring as a subvocal process since the two were not separated.
However, more work is needed to confirm this suggestion. Similar to this study, future
work that seeks to answer the major question of whether resistance is primarily a vocal or
subvocal process needs to attempt to isolate the vocal from the subvocal.
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Furthermore, this study also assessed certainty of beliefs. While this issue was
not addressed in the Ivanov et al. (2012) PIT study they did suggest that engaging in PIT
could serve as reassurance and advocacy for the positions of inoculated individuals. As
such, the findings regarding certainty in this study offer a complement to the work of
Ivanov and colleagues. Namely, the results regarding certainty in this study could be due
to the need for reassurance and advocacy suggested by Ivanov et al. Future studies
should examine this relationship by first establishing whether or not inoculated
participants do indeed feel a need for reassurance and advocacy. Then the study should
try to establish whether or not PIT a) fills any extant reassurance and advocacy needs,
and/or b) increases belief certainty, as the pattern of means in this study suggests.
Another intriguing aspect of the Ivanov et al. (2012) PIT study that was not
considered in this work was anger as a moderating variable. Perhaps anger was the
missing component in this study that caused the largely insignificant results with regard
to PIT and belief protection. Could integrating anger eliciting components into the
inoculation messages encourage PIT and demonstrate that PIT really does contribute to
generated resistance? Findings of this nature would more closely align with the Ivanov et
al. (2012) PIT findings. The idea that anger could promote PIT certainly has logical
foundations. Coping with anger more often leads to approach and possibly even
aggression than to retrieval (Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013). Could this outward-facing type
of anger coping mechanism not be fulfilled by PIT? If the PIT instructions provided are
also accompanied by anger eliciting components the combination of the two could not
only plant the idea for PIT, but also help ensure the conversations occur. Further
research is needed to see if integrating anger eliciting components in the inoculation
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message can extend the pattern of results in this study and boost belief to a significant
level.
Furthermore, the context of the current research poses an intriguing question
regarding the integration of anger messages. Previous research regarding inoculation and
Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT) (Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013) suggests that
integrating reactance – in which anger plays a significant role – can boost threat levels
and thereby increase generated resistance. While integrating such elements as reactance
and anger into inoculation messages can boost resistance, is this a good idea in the crisis
communication context? In a crisis situation a person is already presumably feeling
threatened by the crisis events. Therefore, would the integration of anger, and the
corresponding increased threat, push the threat level too high?
Research that has shown increasing threat with anger can lead to increased
resistance (see Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013) was conducted outside the crisis
communication context. If this coupling of anger and crisis pushed threat levels beyond
those of the anger-enhanced messages used by Miller and colleagues the effects are
unknown. As Compton and Pfau (2005) note, inoculation researchers have historically
struggled to push threat beyond moderate levels. Given threat’s primary role in
inoculation-generated resistance, the ability to create more threat has been a key concern
(see Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013). One line of thinking is that a threat ceiling or threshold
might not exist, and more threat might simply lead to more resistance (Miller, Ivanov, et
al., 2013).
However, some scholars have posited that too much threat could thwart resistance
and therefore moderate levels of threat are ideal (Compton & Pfau, 2005; Compton,
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2009). The idea is that there should be enough threat in the inoculation message to
motivate a person to shore up his or her defenses, but not so much to overwhelm the
person (Compton, 2009). Therefore more research is needed to assess the effect of angerenhanced inoculation messages in crisis. The Ivanov and colleagues (2012) PIT findings
point to more resistance with anger integration while the consideration of the crisis
context in tandem with PRT findings (Miller, Ivanov, et al., 2013) point to possibly overeliciting threat when using anger amidst crises.
Finally, a research direction further prompted by the current investigation is the
use of explicit PIT instructions as a booster treatment. Ivanov and colleagues (2012)
suggested that PIT might serve as a booster treatment for inoculated individuals. This
study seems to confer that suggestion by showing increased belief certainty with PIT.
Past studies that have investigated the effect of booster treatments (e.g., Pfau et al., 2006)
have exposed participants to multiple inoculation treatments and shown that boosters
function best when the second inoculation message is different than the first. Neither this
study nor the Ivanov et al. (2012) study used multiple inoculation messages as an outright
booster though both point to a post-inoculation conversation as serving a booster
function. Not only is the suggestion of PIT as a booster unconfirmed, but future work
needs to assess the interplay between actual booster treatments in the form of inoculation
messages and PIT that might serve a booster function.
Hypothesis addressing loss frame inoculation messages. The tenth hypothesis
in this investigation aimed to provide a perfunctory examination of possible links
between two long-standing bodies of theoretical research, prospect theory (PT) and
inoculation. The complexity of the proceeding discussion necessitates an overview of
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this subsection. First, a general discussion of PT and one of its offspring theories,
regulatory focus (RFT) is in order. Next, extant inoculation studies (Mason & Miller,
2011; Pfau et al., 2001; 2009) that have examined concepts closely related to RFT are
reviewed. To congeal this section three aspects of inoculation are commented on
separately – resistance as an outcome, threat, and counterarguing. The discussion of
these inoculation aspects includes possible links to RFT, perspectives on past research
(Mason & Miller, 2011; Pfau et al., 2001; 2009), insights from the current research, and
suggestions for how RFT and inoculation could be studied together in the future.
First, entering a discussion of PT seems incomplete without also addressing the
vast body of related research concerning RFT. A summary of RFT is also relevant
because previous research (Mason & Miller, 2011) has studied inoculation through the
RFT lens. In its original form, as previously discussed in this study, PT posited that an
emphasis on potential losses rather than potential gains would govern decision making
processes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Long-standing support for the PT construct
(see Rick, 2010) has also led to specialized theories that are based on the idea that losses
loom larger than gains. Of particular interest to this work is the great deal of research
focused on regulatory focus (see Kirmani & Zhu, 2007; Zhu & Myers-Levy, 2007; Zou,
Scholer, & Higgins, 2014). RFT suggests that individuals are either prevention focused
(oriented towards preventing loss) or promotion focused (oriented towards achieving
gains). Furthermore, prevention and promotion focus have shown effects as both state
and trait variables (Zou et al., 2014). Thus individuals can be primed for a prevention
focus with research materials designed to emphasize losses over gains. The assimilation
of these two concepts – a loss frame and a prevention focus (see Zou et al., 2014) –
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provides comfort in conceptualizing these two concepts as equivalent when viewing this
and past inoculation research. For the sake of clarity the loss frame employed in this
study and the negative outcome focus used by Mason and Miller (2011) will henceforth
be referred to as prevention focus.
To help make sense of the results of the current investigation it is important to
review past work that has concerned RFT. In 2011 Mason and Miller examined whether
or not emphasizing a prevention focus would strengthen resistance. Furthermore they
argued that cognitive (as opposed to affective) language in the inoculation message
should enhance the prevention focus effect. While they found strong support for the
impact of prevention focus on generated resistance, they found that using cognitive
language boosted counterarguing but not threat or overall resistance. Pfau and colleagues
(2000) also examined the use of cognitive and affective language in inoculation
treatments though they did not explicitly address prevention focus. Contrary to their
hypotheses cognitive language did not boost resistance, threat, or counterarguing as
compared with affective content. However the findings of Pfau and colleagues (2000)
did point to the ability of anger elicitation to boost threat levels, a finding that was later
confirmed by Miller, Ivanov, and colleagues (2013).
Another inoculation study is relevant to the present discussion of possible RFT
impacts. In 2009 Pfau and colleagues extended seminal work on inoculation and affect
(2001) and compared anger-affective (negative) and happy-affective (positive) messages.
Based on Lazarus’ appraisal theory (1991) – which offers that goal attainment or
obstruction is key to elicited affect – they hypothesized that anger-affective messages
should generate greater resistance than the happy-affective messages. What is most
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considerable to the current study, however, is the way in which Pfau and colleagues
(2009) conceptualized their messages. Negative messages were embedded with language
indicating that goal attainment would be thwarted while positive messages were designed
to facilitate goal attainment. Pfau and colleagues (2009) found that the negative
messages generated greater resistance. Given that the researchers focused on goal
attainment or obstruction, the parallel with prevention or promotion focus – a concept
that has been more thoroughly developed since 2009 – seems clear.
The findings in this study advance the suggestion that RFT can strengthen
generated resistance, in addition to providing several avenues for additional research.
When considered in tandem with the Mason and Miller (2011) and Pfau and colleagues
(2009) findings, the value of emphasizing loss avoidance over potential gains in
inoculation message construction is clear. The prevention focus message in this study
prevented belief slippage significantly more than the promotion focus (i.e., gain frame)
message. The cumulative results of this study, Mason and Miller (2011), and Pfau and
colleagues (2009) should encourage both practitioners and scholars to incorporate a
prevention focus into inoculation efforts. Furthermore the findings of this study are in
line with numerous bodies of research that have found the value in emphasizing losses
over gains (see Rick, 2010).
As a burgeoning area of study, these results also generate many questions about
other potential effects of prevention focus on the inoculation process. Namely, would an
attack message employing a prevention focus overwhelm protection created by a
promotion focus inoculation message? Would a supportive message that used a
prevention focus rival protection created by a promotion focus inoculation message?
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Previous research (Ivanov et al., 2009b; 2012) has found a matching effect with regard to
affect and inoculation. Specifically, when a person with an affective emotional base is
presented with an affect-based inoculation message the generated resistance is stronger.
Would a similar matching scenario occur if – when considering RFT as a trait variable –
a prevention focused individual were presented with a prevention focused inoculation
message?
The fact that RFT considers regulatory focus as both a state and trait variable
(Zou et al., 2014) is worth mentioning when considering RFT and inoculation in tandem.
Inoculation research is largely conducted in multiple phases with a treatment phase
followed in about two weeks with an attack phase (Banas & Rains, 2010). What does this
time lag do for the prevention/promotion focus priming process? Is the lag of two weeks
(which is considered optimal for letting inoculation treatments process) so long that state
prevention focus effects are nil, leaving only trait effects? If so are there benefits to
resistance as a whole in sacrificing inoculation processing time for a stronger regulatory
focus prime? If state RFT effects are depleted by the time between inoculation study
phases then trait regulatory focus needs to be considered a covariate since this and
previous investigations have shown effects for regulatory focus. Future research needs to
address the many questions that arise when trying to balance a regulatory focus prime
with optimal time frames for inoculation treatments.
Findings from this and previous investigations also call for a more nuanced look
at exactly how the prevention focus message should be structured. Specifically, this
study posits that attempts should be made to boost belief certainty and threat and that a
closer look should be taken at counterarguing. In this study the prevention focus
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inoculation message did not demonstrate higher belief certainty than the promotion focus
inoculation message. An increase in belief certainty should strengthen generated
resistance; therefore attempts should be made to engineer a prevention focused
inoculation message that also increases belief certainty. The findings from this study
regarding PIT might hold the key. In the current study the PIT message that enhanced
certainty was simply the prevention focused inoculation message with a sentence
encouraging PIT added at the end. Thus the findings from this investigation suggest a
very simple solution to the problem of lack of belief certainty with use of a prevention
focused inoculation message – ask participants to PIT.
Another intriguing potential enhancement to a prevention focused inoculation
message, as suggested earlier in this study, is integration of anger elicitation. After all,
Pfau and colleagues (2000) studied message framing, a very similar concept to RFT, and
found that anger could boost threat. Could it be that this study provides a missing link to
cumulative study results and a trifecta of inoculation success exists? Could a prevention
focused inoculation message enhanced with anger elicitation (for threat) and PIT
instructions (for certainty) exceed the current generated resistance ceiling? Future work
that combines prevention/promotion focus, anger elicitation, and PIT is needed to
ascertain the effect of this combination on generated resistance.
While the suggestion to integrate these three elements is certainly intriguing, the
next logical question is: What about counterarguing? As a long-standing consideration
in inoculation research, trying to boost multiple elements of the process without also
boosting counterarguing seems amiss. However, the findings of Pfau and colleagues
(2009) suggest that counterarguing could increase as a side benefit of employing a
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prevention focus. In their study the negative, or anger-affective messages resulted in
higher counterarguing output. Similarly, in the other inoculation study most closely
related to this investigation’s focus on RFT (Mason & Miller, 2011), the investigators
found that a prevention focused message could boost counterarguing. When considering
the work of Mason and Miller (2011) and Pfau and colleagues (2009) it does not appear
that counterarguing output has to be sacrificed to use a prevention focused inoculation
message enhanced with anger and a suggestion to PIT.
Finally, there are also contextual questions raised by this research that should be
addressed in future studies. Could the positive results for prevention focused messages
replicate outside the context of financial investing? The context of this study lent itself to
easy manipulation of gain and loss language. However, could gain and loss language also
be applied for strengthening of generated resistance in other areas of inoculation
research? For example, could inoculation campaigns in the health communication
context (see Ivanov, 2011) be strengthened by emphasizing the consequences of
unhealthy behavior as opposed to the benefits of healthy behavior, similar to previous
work (Mason & Miller, 2011)? Or could an inoculation message designed to prevent
risky behavior in adolescents (see Parker et al., 2012) benefit from illustrating potential
losses such as sexual health and reputation damage? And, most relevant to this study,
could an organization using inoculation messages as a preemptive crisis communication
strategy emphasize the consequence of a lost business relationship between itself and its
stakeholders as a way to strengthen beliefs during forthcoming crises? These questions
can serve as a solid starting point for future research concerning inoculation and RFT.

Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the results of this study advance both the research opportunities
and applied potential of inoculation theory. The findings that inoculation can function in
crisis situations, that inoculation messages will not harm beliefs in the absence of a crisis,
and that protection generated by inoculation treatments can resist persuasive attacks
presented through video boost the practical utility of the theory. Additionally, this study
has illustrated the potential for inoculation messages to be used by organizations as a
preemptive crisis communication strategy. This potential is especially potent for
financial institutions that need a way to protect SIM beliefs prior to periods of market
turbulence.
The validity of past inoculation studies that have found inoculation to be a
superior strategy to a supportive-only one and that have used print messages is also
supported by this study. This consistency with past inoculation research strengthens
inoculation research as a whole and helps lay a more solid foundation for crisis
communication as a burgeoning area of inoculation scholarship. Ancillary findings
concerning PIT and loss frame inoculation messages are also intriguing and beg for more
study. Though some of the results in this investigation were not as predicted, the value of
this work to the overall body of inoculation research and to the practice of crisis
communication should not be diminished.

Copyright © Lindsay L. Dillingham 2014
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APPENDIX A:
Sample Questionnaire
A sample questionnaire containing all three phases of this study can be found on
the following pages. The questionnaire provided in this appendix contains the
inoculation (loss frame) treatment message in phase two and the print attack in phase
three. The questionnaire for the participants not in these groups differed only in the
treatment message received in phase two (or lack thereof in the case of the control group)
and the attack message received in phase three (or lack thereof for the no crisis group).
The questionnaire included in this appendix has been modified from the online format
presented to participants via Qualtrics survey software. As such, this document mirrors
the actual survey format as closely as possible. Section titles (e.g., “welcome”,
“consent”, “demographics”) were also added to this document to facilitate transfer of the
information from an online format.
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PHASE ONE
Welcome:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on investing.

The data for this study will be collected through three phases, or three separate online
surveys. The total amount of time expected to complete the study is 45 minutes to an
hour, or 15 to 20 minutes per phase.

You are about to complete Phase 1, which is the first of three phases. In two weeks you
will be given access to Phase 2. Two weeks after completing Phase 2 you will be
emailed a link that provides you with access to Phase 3. Once you have completed Phase
3 you are done with the study.

Thank you again for helping me understand how investors react to bad news. The part
you have agreed to play in this research is very important.

Lindsay L. Dillingham

Consent:

Consent to Participate in Research Study
You are receiving access to this study, titled “Using inoculation messages to protect ‘stay
in the market’ beliefs during financial crises” because you selected it from the list of
available studies in the COM research participation system.

There is no guarantee you will get any direct benefit from this research. However, your
responses may help us understand more about the way investors react to bad news about
the financial markets.
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We hope to receive completed questionnaires from about 350 people, so your answers are
important to us. Of course, you have a choice about whether or not to complete the
survey/questionnaire, but if you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or
discontinue at any time.

The data for this study will be collected through three phases, or three separate online
surveys. The total amount of time expected to complete the study is 45 minutes to an
hour, or 15 to 20 minutes per phase. After signing up for this study, you will emailed a
link. This link will take you to an online survey management tool that will allow you to
complete phase one. Phase one will consist of reading a message and then completing
questionnaires about your views. Two weeks after completing phase one you will be
emailed a link for phase two. In this phase you will read a message (different than the one
in phase one) and then complete questionnaires about your views. In some cases you will
be completing questionnaires about your views without first reading a message. Two
weeks after completing phase two window you will be emailed a link for phase three.
Phase three consists of either watching a short video clip or reading a message and then
completing questionnaires about your views. Completion of phase three means you have
completed the study.

You will receive one research credit for completing the survey/questionnaire. If you do
not want to participate, there are alternatives to earning this credit. See you course
syllabus or instructor for more information. To successfully earn one research credit all
three phases must be completed. Failure to complete all three phases will result in no
research credit awarded for participation.

There are no known risks to participating in this study.

We will keep private all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by law.
However, we may be required to show information which identifies you to people who
need to be sure we have done the research correctly; these would be people from such
organizations as the University of Kentucky. Please be aware, while we make every
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effort to safeguard your data once received from the online survey/data gathering
company, given the nature of online surveys, as with anything involving the Internet, we
can never guarantee the confidentiality of the data while still on the survey/data gathering
company’s servers, or while en route to either them or us. It is also possible the raw data
collected for research purposes may be used for marketing or reporting purposes by the
survey/data gathering company after the research is concluded, depending on the
company’s Terms of Service and Privacy policies.

If you have questions about the study, please feel free to ask me or my faculty advisor;
our contact information is given below. If you have complaints, suggestions, or questions
about your rights as a research volunteer, contact the staff in the University of Kentucky
Office of Research Integrity at 859-257-9428 or toll-free at 1-866-400-9428.

Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project.

Sincerely,

Lindsay Dillingham, Doctoral Student, lldillingham@uky.edu
Bobi Ivanov, Ph.D., bobi.ivanov@uky.edu

College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky

Clicking on the "I agree" button will indicate your agreement to participate and send you
to the survey site.

If you choose not to participate please click "I decline" and you will be taken to the
survey exit.


I agree



I decline
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Age:
What is your age?


17 or younger



25



33



18



26



34



19



27



35



20



28



36



21



29



37



22



30



38



23



31



39



24



32



40+

Demographics:
Gender:


Male



Female

What is your ethnic background?


White/Caucasian



Native American



African American



Pacific Islander



Hispanic



Other (please specify)



Asian

Lead-in:
You are about to begin the study. Please read each page carefully. You will be provided
with a message and then be asked to answer questions about your reactions. Please think
through each answer you provide. If you are ready to proceed please click on the arrow
below to continue.
Belief creation:
Do you think you will ever invest money in the stock market, either through an
employer’s retirement plan or a through a private investment? If so do you know what
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your goals should be? After all, investing without goals can have serious financial
consequences!

Typically the goals for investing are simple: buy and hold or buy low and sell high. The
logic behind each of these tried and true investment strategies is very basic. Let’s review
each one separately.

Buy and hold:
Historical market data shows that over time the overall value of stocks has risen
tremendously. Looking at market movement on a chart shows that, even though the stock
market sometimes goes down, buying and holding stocks for the long term is a good way
to make money. Eventually investors can sell stock when it reaches a high point. So, a
buy and hold strategy is used when investors commit to holding a stock for a minimum
period of time and then sell the stock at some point after the minimum time commitment
but when the value is high.

Buy low and sell high:
Some investors prefer a more active strategy. Buy and hold investors might commit to
holding a stock for ten years! Those who want a more active strategy can opt for an
alternative strategy – buy low and sell high. This strategy requires investors to watch
periodic changes in stock values. Investors will purchase stock when the value is down
and then sell the same stock for more money when the price of the stock goes up. Even
though this requires a more watchful eye on the part of the investor, money can be made
using this strategy.
Regardless of which strategy investors prefer – buy and hold or buy low and sell high –
there is one important thing to remember. The time to sell stocks is not when the market
is down! To be a successful investor one must never sell stock during a down market.
Both a buy and hold and buy low and sell high strategy require only selling stock when
the market is up.
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Remember these simple principles for investing success!

Belief scale:
Please examine the statement below and then answer the following questions based on
your overall perceptions.

People should sell their stock when the market is down.
Disagree
1

2

Agree
3

4

5

6

7

No
1

Yes
2

3

4

5

6

7

False
1

True
2

3

4

5

6

7

Wrong
1

Right
2

3

4

5

6

7

Incorrect
1

2

Correct
3

4

5

6

7

Certainty measure:
How certain do you feel towards the statement below? Zero indicates “no certainty” and
100 indicates “absolutely certain”.
People should sell their stock when the market is down.
__________________________

Involvement scale:
How relevant to you is the topic of selling stocks when the market is down?
Unimportant
1

2

Important
3

4

5

6

7

Irrelevant
1

2

Relevant
3

4

5

6

7

Nonessential

Essential
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Of no concern to me
1

2

3

Of concern to me
4

5

6

7

Does not matter to me
1

2

3

Matters to me
4

5

6

7

Useless
1

2

Useful
3

4

5

6

7

Trivial
1

Fundamental
2

3

4

5

6

7

Risk scale:
Please carefully consider the statements below and answer based on your usual behavior.

Although a new thing has a high promise of reward, I do not want to be the first one who
tries it.


Extremely like me



Like me



Somewhat like me



Somewhat like me



Unlike me



Extremely like me

I would rather wait until it has been tested and proven before I try it.


Extremely like me



Like me



Somewhat like me



Somewhat like me



Unlike me



Extremely like me

When I have to make a decision for which the consequence is not clear, I like to go with
the safer option although it may yield limited rewards.


Extremely like me



Like me



Somewhat like me



Somewhat like me



Unlike me



Extremely like me

I like to try new things, knowing well that some of them will disappoint me.
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Extremely like me



Like me



Somewhat like me



Somewhat like me



Unlike me



Extremely like me

To earn greater rewards, I am willing to take higher risks.


Extremely like me



Like me



Somewhat like me



Somewhat like me



Unlike me



Extremely like me

Investing experience:
Please rate your level of experience with investing in the stock market.
No experience
1

2

A lot of experience
3

4

5

6

7

Lead-in:
The next few questions ask you consider times you have come into contact with
viewpoints that are unlike your own. Think of how you reacted in those situations. Then,
please choose the answer choice that most closely reflects how much each statement
describes you.

Personal information:
Please enter the requested information below so you can properly complete the study:
Last name:

__________________________

First name:

__________________________

*University email address*

__________________________

Student ID

__________________________

PHASE TWO

Welcome:
Welcome back to this study on investing. You are now entering the second of three
phases. Please remember that it is very important to carefully read each page and
consider your answers.

Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project.

Sincerely,
Lindsay Dillingham, Doctoral Student, lldillingham@uky.edu
Bobi Ivanov, Ph.D., bobi.ivanov@uky.edu

College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky

Lead-in:
This section of the survey contains a message about an issue, which is followed by
exercises and scales concerning the message. Therefore it is extremely important that
you read the message carefully since some of the questions pertain to the message you
have just read.

Treatment message:
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock market
requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term. Both of
these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down. Either of these
disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell
stock when the market is down. However, despite these simple financial principles, in
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling
stock at a loss more than ever before. In fact, people like you who feel confident in their
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock
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at some of the lowest points in history. Often these sales occur after investors have seen
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down
markets despite frightening news stories? How about when you may feel that all your
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings? Even if you believe
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as
prepared as you think you are.

One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is that they
can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets. In one recent interview, an
investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go down
every day…it troubles me. I feel I have to get out while I can.”

While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay
compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns. For
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would
have only received $600! However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today! Even more striking, $1,000 invested
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of
stocks has risen over 200%. As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur. Ignoring
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason.

Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling after
several days of downward movement will prevent further losses. Even though no one
can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually increase
their total market losses. Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down market
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occurs during the first signs of upswing. Therefore, investors who sell to prevent further
losses actually miss the chance to recover their money.

Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial consequences
make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when the market is
down! Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the false logic that
you can prevent further losses. It just makes sense for your financial future!

Belief scale:
Please examine the statement below and then answer the following questions based on
your overall perceptions.

People should sell their stock when the market is down.
Disagree
1

2

Agree
3

4

5

6

7

No
1

Yes
2

3

4

5

6

7

False
1

True
2

3

4

5

6

7

Wrong
1

Right
2

3

4

5

6

7

Incorrect
1

2

Correct
3

4

5

6

7

Certainty measure:
How certain do you feel towards the statement below? Zero indicates “no certainty” and
100 indicates “absolutely certain”.
People should sell their stock when the market is down.
__________________________
.
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Threat Scale:
I find the possibility of being persuaded to sell stock during a down market to be:
Nonthreatening
1

2

3

Threatening
4

5

6

7

Unintimidating
1

2

3

Intimidating
4

5

6

7

Not harmful
1

2

Harmful
3

4

5

6

7

Dangerous
1

2

Safe
3

4

5

6

7

Not Risky
1

2

Risky
3

4

5

6

7

Personal information:
Please enter the requested information below so you can properly complete the study:
Last name:

__________________________

First name:

__________________________

*University email address*

__________________________

Student ID

__________________________

.
.
.
.
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PHASE THREE

Welcome:
Welcome back to this study on investing. You are now entering the last of three phases.
Please remember that it is very important to carefully view each page and consider your
answers.

Thank you in advance for your assistance with this important project.

Sincerely,
Lindsay Dillingham, Doctoral Student, lldillingham@uky.edu
Bobi Ivanov, Ph.D., bobi.ivanov@uky.edu

College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky

Lead-in:
This section of the survey contains a message about an issue, which is followed by
exercises and scales concerning the message. Therefore, it is extremely important that
you read the message carefully since some of the questions pertain to the message you
have just read.
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Print crisis message:
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Belief scale:
Please examine the statement below and then answer the following questions based on
your overall perceptions.

People should sell their stock when the market is down.
Disagree
1

2

Agree
3

4

5

6

7

No
1

Yes
2

3

4

5

6

7

False
1

True
2

3

4

5

6

7

Wrong
1

Right
2

3

4

5

6

7

Incorrect
1

2

Correct
3

4

5

6

7

Certainty measure:
How certain do you feel towards the statement below? Zero indicates “no certainty” and
100 indicates “absolutely certain”.
People should sell their stock when the market is down.
__________________________

Counterarguing:
The next section of the survey asks you to recall your thoughts and feelings while you
read the previous message. Once you have provided an argument, please proceed to
columns two and three and answer the relevant questions about that argument. Then
please proceed to describing the next argument.
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How strong do you think or feel the
arguments you checked off
are? Please do not provide a
rating for arguments you did
not check off in the previous
column.

Check off ONLY arguments that
you thought of about the issue of
selling stock when the market is
down.

Investments should be sold
during a market downturn to
prevent further loss.
Investments should be held
during a market downturn to
benefit from future upswings.
Selling investments during a
market downturn should only
be done if you must have the
money.
Selling investments during a
market downturn is a good
way to keep your money safe.
Making money from
investments requires enduring
uncertainty when the market
goes down.
Investors should not have to
worry that they are losing
money, so they should sell
their securities when the value
goes down.
No matter how bad the
market gets, investors should
stay strong and wait to
recover their losses.
If an investor needs to sell
their investments while the
market is down, they should
try their best to get the money
somewhere else or wait until
the market goes back up.
Investors should purchase
investments with the attitude
that holdings should be sold if
a bad market makes them
nervous.

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

Correct
6 7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

Correct
6 7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7
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Correct
7

Investors should purchase
investments expecting ups
and downs but feeling
committed to not selling them
during a down market.
If an investor gets uneasy
about lost value of their
investments, he or she should
sell no matter which way the
market is moving.
An investor should sell
investments if he or she feels
uncomfortable, regardless of
whether the value is up or
down.

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

3

4

5

6

Correct
7

_____

Incorrect
1 2

5

Correct
6 7

3

4

Personal information:
Please enter the requested information below so you can properly complete the study:
Last name:

__________________________

First name:

__________________________

*University email address*

__________________________

Student ID

__________________________
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APPENDIX B:
Treatment Messages
As explained in the methods section of this investigation, five treatment messages
were used. Four of the treatment messages were slightly varied inoculation messages
(inoculation loss frame, inoculation gain frame, PIT, no PIT) and one supportive message
was used. The five treatment messages randomly assigned to participants and used in
phase two of this study are presented in the proceeding pages.
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INOCULATION: LOSS FRAME
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down. Either of
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell
stock when the market is down. However, despite these simple financial principles, in
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling
stock at a loss more than ever before. In fact, people like you who feel confident in their
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock
at some of the lowest points in history. Often these sales occur after investors have seen
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down
markets despite frightening news stories? How about when you may feel that all your
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings? Even if you believe
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as
prepared as you think you are.
One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets. In one recent interview,
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go
down every day…it troubles me. I feel I have to get out while I can.”
While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay
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compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns. For
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would
have only received $600! However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today! Even more striking, $1,000 invested
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of
stocks has risen over 200%. As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur. Ignoring
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason.
Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling
after several days of downward movement will prevent further losses. Even though no
one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually
increase their total market losses. Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down
market occurs during the first signs of upswing. Therefore, investors who sell to prevent
further losses actually miss the chance to recover their money.
Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when
the market is down! Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the
false logic that you can prevent further losses. It just makes sense for your financial
future!
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INOCULATION: GAIN FRAME
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down. Either of
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell
stock when the market is down. However, despite these simple financial principles, in
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and missing the
chance to profit from stock more than ever before. In fact, people like you who feel
confident in their ability to withstand down markets are avoiding potential gains by
selling their stock at some of the lowest points in history. Often these sales occur after
investors have seen news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that no
money can be made in the stock market…Are you prepared to hold your current or future
investments through down markets despite frightening news stories? How about when
you may feel that all your hard work is for nothing and you really might not make any
money? Even if you believe you could think logically while watching the value of your
investments decrease every day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate
that you may not be as prepared as you think you are.
One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets. In one recent interview,
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go
down every day…it troubles me. I feel I have to get out while I can.”
While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay
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for the money that can be made by withstanding the emotional pull of market downturns.
Consider this – even though the markets have been very turbulent since 2008, $1,000
invested in the stock market in 2006 would be worth at least $2,250 today! Even more
striking, $1,000 invested in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two
decades the overall value of stocks has risen over 200%. As you can see, a buy-and-hold
investment strategy can offer amazing returns even though ups and downs in the stock
market inevitably occur. Ignoring tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary
discomfort is an unfortunate example of investors who miss major financial gains for no
good reason.
Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling
after several days of downward movement they feel no gains are possible. Even though
no one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it can’t
make money during the market upswings. Research has shown that the biggest jump
after a down market occurs during the first signs of upswing. Therefore, investors who
sell to prevent further losses could instead choose to recover their money and build
wealth over the long term.
Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when
the market is down! Loads of market data shows that waiting through uncertainty can
help you make money. It just makes sense for your financial future!
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INOCULATION: PIT
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down. Either of
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell
stock when the market is down. However, despite these simple financial principles, in
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling
stock at a loss more than ever before. In fact, people like you who feel confident in their
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock
at some of the lowest points in history. Often these sales occur after investors have seen
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down
markets despite frightening news stories? How about when you may feel that all your
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings? Even if you believe
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as
prepared as you think you are.
One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets. In one recent interview,
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go
down every day…it troubles me. I feel I have to get out while I can.”
While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay
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compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns. For
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would
have only received $600! However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today! Even more striking, $1,000 invested
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of
stocks has risen over 200%. As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur. Ignoring
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason.
Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling
after several days of downward movement will prevent further losses. Even though no
one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually
increase their total market losses. Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down
market occurs during the first signs of upswing. Therefore, investors who sell to prevent
further losses actually miss the chance to recover their money.
Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when
the market is down! Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the
false logic that you can prevent further losses. It just makes sense for your financial
future!
After reading this message, please talk to as many fellow investors as you can
about the importance of staying in the market during downturns.
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INOCULATION: NO PIT
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down. Either of
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by
understanding market fluctuation and not succumbing to the emotional pressure to sell
stock when the market is down. However, despite these simple financial principles, in
recent years market events have shown that some investors are panicking and selling
stock at a loss more than ever before. In fact, people like you who feel confident in their
ability to withstand down markets are creating unrecoverable losses by selling their stock
at some of the lowest points in history. Often these sales occur after investors have seen
news stories that report unprecedented events, leading to fear that further losses will
occur…Are you prepared to hold your current or future investments through down
markets despite frightening news stories? How about when you may feel that all your
hard work is for nothing and you really could lose your life savings? Even if you believe
you could think logically while watching the value of your investments decrease every
day, actions of investors during the past few years indicate that you may not be as
prepared as you think you are.
One of the reasons investors give for selling stock during market downturns is
that they can no longer take the uncertainty of turbulent markets. In one recent interview,
an investor offered that, “I just can’t take it…watching the value of my investments go
down every day…it troubles me. I feel I have to get out while I can.”
While occasional uncertainty might be one negative side effect of a disciplined
investment strategy, historical market data proves that uncertainty is a small price to pay
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compared with the losses that occur when one sells stock during market downturns. For
example, if $1,000 invested in 2006 had been sold in 2007 or 2008 the investor would
have only received $600! However, if that $1,000 had been held through the market
downturns it would be worth at least $2,250 today! Even more striking, $1,000 invested
in the year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of
stocks has risen over 200%. As you can see, a buy-and-hold investment strategy can
prevent losses even though ups and downs in the stock market inevitably occur. Ignoring
tried-and-true investment strategies to avoid temporary discomfort is a sad example of
investors who hurt their financial health for no good reason.
Another reason investors give for selling stock at the wrong time is that selling
after several days of downward movement will prevent further losses. Even though no
one can know exactly when the “bottom” hits, investors who sell to avoid it actually
increase their total market losses. Research has shown that the biggest jump after a down
market occurs during the first signs of upswing. Therefore, investors who sell to prevent
further losses actually miss the chance to recover their money.
Since selling stock during market downturns has such serious financial
consequences make sure that, if given the opportunity, you don’t sell your stocks when
the market is down! Decades of market data is more important than uncertainty or the
false logic that you can prevent further losses. It just makes sense for your financial
future!
After reading this message, please do not talk to anyone about the importance of
staying in the market during downturns.
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SUPPORTIVE
As most investors and potential investors know, making a profit in the stock
market requires either buying low and selling high or holding investments long term.
Both of these strategies require not selling stock when the market goes down. Either of
these disciplined investment strategies allow investors to maximize portfolio returns by
understanding market fluctuation and only selling when the market is high or the value or
their stocks has increased. Understanding these simple financial principles has allowed
many investors to maximize their returns. Following the basic rules of buy low and sell
high or buy and hold can have major positive outcomes for investors and potential
investors.
You can be one of the investors who makes a great deal of money on your
portfolio if you heed simple investing guidelines. Remember, the goal for investors is to
buy and hold or buy low and sell high. Historical market information shows the clear
benefit of these plans for investors and potential investors. For example, $1,000 invested
in 2006 would be worth at least $2,250 today! Even more striking, $1,000 invested in the
year 2000 would now be worth $5,750! In the past two decades the overall value of
stocks has risen over 200%. As you can see, a buy and hold or buy low and sell high
investment strategy can boost your performance even though ups and downs in the
market will inevitably happen over time. By maintaining the tried-and-true investment
strategies of buy and hold or buy low and sell high you can improve your overall
financial health. You can make sure that all of your hard work and savings pays off and
you are able to make money on your current or future investments.
Another reason for not selling stocks when the market is down is that you can
avoid transaction fees. Consider this – If you ever have money in the stock market you
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must pay a fee every time you want to buy or sell stock! Paying these transaction fees
can greatly reduce the funds you have to invest. If you sell stock when the market goes
down you are losing money in two ways. First, the value of the investment has decreased
since you made the purchase. For example, if you buy several shares of a stock at $20
and then sell it after the value of the stock has fallen to $15 you have lost $5 per share.
The second way you will lose money if you sell stocks when the market is down is by
paying the transaction fee. In addition to the $5 per share you have already lost you will
have to pay a certain amount per share for selling the stock. By losing money in both of
these ways – the decrease in the stock value and the transaction fees – you can hurt your
current or future financial well-being. So, don’t sell stocks when the market is down.
Loads of market data shows that holding onto stocks just makes sense for your
financial future! Over time you can make money and feel confident that you’ve made
sound decisions. Remember that it is wise to avoid selling the stocks you have already
purchased. You can be a successful investor or potential investor by considering simple
investing ideas. The choice is yours; only you have the ability to avoid selling your
stocks when the market goes down!
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APPENDIX C:
Attack Messages
Two attack messages were used in this study. One attack message was presented
in video and the other was presented in print. The video message was edited to the
desired content and then the print attack message was designed to mirror the content of
the video message as closely as possible. The print attack message is presented in this
appendix. Since the video attack message could not be inserted into this document
directions for understanding the content of the message are provided in this document. A
transcript with editing cues from the original video is provided in the pages to follow.
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PRINT ATTACK MESSAGE
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VIDEO ATTACK MESSAGE TRANSCRIPT
Section 1:
Anchor: Traders seemed to be in a rush to get to work despite the carnage but the Wall
Street bull – once again – was going nowhere.
Anchor: Alan Valdez has seen the stock market go in one direction, down, for months.
Valdez: The whole industry is in flux now. Everybody is worried about the financials.
Anchor: It would be a bad opening.
Vadlez: All my indications right now are all on the sell side.
Reporter: Everybody wants to sell?
Vadlez: Yes. Right now everything I got is on the sell side.
Anchor: Even the pros like Valdez are shocked by what’s happened.
Valdez: I’ve never seen markets like this. Things are really monumental down here.
They’re…really historical what’s going on down here.
Section 2:
Anchor: Right now, breaking news here. Stocks all around the world are tanking
because of the crisis on Wall Street. Pauline Chu is in for Jennifer this morning. I can’t
imagine how jittery the nerves must be on Wall Street for that open.
Chu: Well I can tell you already that the Dow is expected to open down 300 points this
morning, Robin. So that gives you an indication of how jittery the markets are. This is
such a blow to investors.
Section 3:
Anchor: Ali Velshi, let me start with you. What the hell is going on?
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Velshi: It was basically the sense that we are so uncertain about where the global
economy is going that people just decided to, to take their, their money out and basically,
uh, do the equivalent – the global equivalent – of taking your money and stuffing it in a
mattress. Everybody just wanted to pull out and say “I don’t want to go into tomorrow
where this unemployment number is coming out in the morning not knowing what’s
happening, not able to get out of my positions.” They did it ahead of time; it just
compounded on itself. Fear took over. And, uh, people started selling their stocks uh, in,
in this mass momentum move.
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